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Mass Privatization, State Capacity and Economic Growth in Post-Communist 
Countries 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Why did the transition from socialism to capitalism result in improved growth in some countries 
and significant economic decline in others? Three main arguments have been advanced: (1) 
successful countries rapidly implemented neoliberal policies; (2) failures were not due to policies 
but to poor institutional environments; and (3) policies were counterproductive because they 
damaged the state. We present a state-centered theory, and empirically demonstrate for the first 
time one of several possible mechanisms linking neoliberal policies to poor economic 
performance: mass privatization programs, where implemented, created a massive fiscal shock 
for post-communist governments, thereby undermining the development of private sector 
governance institutions and severely exacerbating the transformational recession. We perform 
cross-national panel regressions for a sample of 30 post-communist countries between 1990 and 
2000, and find that mass privatization programs negatively affected economic growth, state 
capacity, and property rights protection. These findings are corroborated with firm-level data 
from a representative survey of managers in 3,890 companies operating in 24 post-communist 
countries. We show that within countries which implemented mass-privatized programs, newly 
privatized firms were substantially less likely to engage in industrial restructuring but 
considerably more likely to use barter and accumulate tax arrears than their state-owned 
counterparts. 
 
    3
Between 1989 and 1991, the Soviet empire disintegrated. Western-trained neoliberal economists 
provided the blueprint for constructing capitalism amidst the ruins of state socialism, advocating 
“shock therapy”: rapid privatization, liberalization of prices and trade, and fiscal and monetary 
austerity (UNDP 1999). Although sociologists and economists critiqued these policies and their 
pace (e.g. Stark 1992; Burawoy and Krotov 1992; Kornai 1990, 1995), a group of neoclassical 
economists at Harvard believed that they were necessary; this perspective was also dominant 
among economists working for international financial institutions (Cohen 2001; Wedel 2001).
1 
As Lawrence Summers put it, “Despite economists’ reputation for never being able to agree on 
anything, there is a striking degree of unanimity in the advice that has been provided to the 
nations of Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. ... [P]rivatization, stabilization, and 
liberalization ... must all be completed as soon as possible” (1994: 252-253). Most post-
communist countries implemented versions of the shock therapy package. Of the three major 
policies, privatization proved to be the most difficult to implement and yielded the greatest 
variance in outcomes. 
Despite initial optimism, economic performance was disastrous in most post-communist 
countries, as shown in Figure 1. Between 1990 and 1996, per capita income in Russia and most 
of the former Soviet Union (FSU) fell by over 30% (Rosefielde 2001) – slightly less than the 
decline in the United States during the Great Depression (see Online Supplement A for a 
graphical comparison). Yet, not all countries fared as poorly. Estonia’s economy, which recorded 
an initial 20.2% drop in GDP between 1990 and 1994, fully recovered by 1997 and, by 2000, 
achieved 29.3% higher per capita income levels than in 1990. Poland, Hungary, Czech Republic, 
Slovakia, and Slovenia experienced the lowest declines in per capita incomes, bottoming out at 
roughly 10% in 1992. By 1994, these countries surpassed pre-transition income levels, and for   4
the next six years, experienced balanced growth (recording a 39.8% increase in per capita 
income between 1990 and 2000).  
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
To evaluate the competing explanations of this variation, we first review the initial theories 
of transition and the leading ‘post-mortem’ explanations of the post-communist economic 
depression. We then outline the neo-Weberian theory from which we derive our own hypotheses. 
In the subsequent sections, we report the results of our country- and firm-level analyses and 
discuss the implications of our findings for sociological theory and public policy.  
 
INITIAL THEORIES OF ECONOMIC TRANSITION 
Neoliberal policy recommendations were grounded in the notion that economic development 
could be achieved by relying on the power of market forces and private property, unleashed by a 
radical curtailment of the state. Neoliberals argued that rapid liberalization of prices and trade, 
alongside privatization and macroeconomic stabilization, would set free economic restructuring, 
leading to growth and convergence with the West (Sachs 1994: 25). The European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development’s (EBRD) 1999 Transition Report summarizes the consensus 
of foreign advisors and post-communist elites at the start of the transition: “Private ownership 
would ensure profit-oriented corporate governance, while liberalization of trade and prices would 
set free the competitive market forces that reward profitable activities. Firms would have 
therefore both internal and external incentives to restructure” (1999: 167). 
Economically, neoliberal reforms were expected to combine the advantage of “true prices” 
with “a fully private incentive structure,” thus promoting enterprise restructuring (EBRD 1999: 
167; see also Lipton and Sachs 1990a; Sachs 1992a, 1996; Fischer and Gelb 1991; Kosolowski   5
1992; Blanchard et al. 1993: 10-11; Carlin, van Reenen, and Wolfe 1994: 72; Frydman, Gray and 
Rapaczynski 1996). Neoliberals also advanced a rationale of political expediency: they believed 
that a period of “extraordinary politics” following the collapse of communism gave elites a brief 
window of opportunity to implement reforms, after which managers and workers of state-owned 
enterprises might seek to halt, or even roll back, privatization and liberalization efforts in order 
to prevent lay-offs (Lipton and Sachs 1990b: 298; see also Blanchard et al. 1991: xiv; Frydman, 
Rapaczynski, and Turkowitz 1997: 84). As Sachs noted at the time, “The need to accelerate 
privatization is the paramount economic policy issue facing Eastern Europe. If there is no 
breakthrough in the privatization of large enterprises in the near future, the entire process could 
be stalled for years to come. Privatization is urgent and politically vulnerable” (Sachs 1992b: 
71). Similarly, Ira Lieberman, senior official at the World Bank’s mass privatization advisory 
program, stated that “There was a concern by Russian reformers, above all, that the communists 
might soon take control again; their desire, therefore was to move as rapidly as possible, i.e., to 
create ‘facts on the ground’ that made a market economy irreversible” (Lieberman, Kessides and 
Gobbo 2008: 61).  
The need for rapid privatization posed considerable challenges. While economists and 
policymakers had long understood how to stabilize and liberalize economies (by raising interest 
rates, limiting monetary emissions, freeing prices, and opening up trade), the attempt to privatize 
an entire economy within a few years was unprecedented, and doing so without an existing class 
of private investors seemed almost impossible. According to three senior World Bank 
bureaucrats involved in the implementation of mass privatization, “It quickly became apparent 
that the ‘Classical privatisation’ model practiced in the UK and New Zealand and emulated by 
other countries such as Mexico and Argentina would simply not work in the region. ... [T]here   6
were too many state-owned companies … that needed to be privatised rapidly. Implementing 
privatisation on a case-by-case basis over many years risked missing the ‘window of 
opportunity’ for real structural change” (Lieberman et al. 2008: 12).  
One attractive option was privatization to foreign owners. It was determined, however, that 
foreign capital would be rejected by many local elites due to economic nationalism, and that 
foreigners would not purchase vast swathes of unprofitable and technologically obsolete Soviet 
firms. Employee Share Ownership Programs were another quick method of privatization which 
concentrated individual employee-owned shares and protected them from take-over attempts by 
outside investors, but they were considered unacceptable since entrenched labor interests might 
discourage foreign investment and prevent restructuring (Ellerman 2003). Management and 
Employee Buyouts could be equally fast, but were rejected as a standalone option. To be viable 
from a neoliberal policy standpoint, individual shares would have to be transferable, and sale to 
outside owners encouraged, so that capital markets could develop. 
Thus, with foreign investment unlikely and exclusive insider ownership undesirable, the 
policy solution was called “mass” privatization and would give firm insiders and citizens 
vouchers that were redeemable for shares at nominal cost (or in many cases, free of charge). 
Whole sectors of the economy could be rapidly privatized using these vouchers.
2 While most 
countries adopted several different privatization strategies, as described in Online Supplement B, 
mass privatization was by far the most innovative method, and was implemented by 
approximately half of the post-communist world to varying degrees (see Online Supplement C).  
Would privatization, implemented prior to restructuring and in the absence of capitalist 
institutions, be adequate to generate growth? Would there not be governance problems, 
information deficits, and potential market failures? The neoliberal answer resembled a political   7
Coase theorem: “Privatization … offers an enormous political benefit for the creation of 
institutions supporting private property because it creates the very private owners who then begin 
lobbying the government … to create market-supporting institutions… [Such] institutions would 
follow private property rather than the other way around” (Shleifer and Vishny 1998; 10-11; our 
emphasis).  
Although neoliberal ideas dominated transition policy formation, they were criticized from 
the beginning by “gradualist” voices emphasizing the importance of state-guided institutional 
reform (e.g. Murrell 1992; Burawoy and Krotov 1992; Stark 1992). The gradualist position held 
that in the absence of a supportive institutional environment, radical reforms would be 
damaging: privatization might lead to asset-stripping rather than investment, and rapid reforms 
might create economic winners who subsequently engage in predatory behavior. China’s 
trajectory is frequently cited as evidence for the benefits of gradual reform (e.g. Burawoy 1996).  
Shock therapy advocates won the policy debate in most countries. However, instead of 
improved performance throughout the post-communist region, there ensued great economic 
decline followed by considerable divergence in subsequent recovery. How did scholars explain 
this variation in outcomes?  
 
THE POST-MORTEM LITERATURE – MAIN EXPLANATIONS OF POST-COMMUNIST ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE 
Both gradualists and shock therapy advocates claimed that the facts vindicated their original 
positions. The shock therapists, however, made one important concession: institutions and other 
“initial conditions” mattered more than they had previously acknowledged. As Milton Friedman 
put it when reflecting on post-communist Russia, “It turns out that the rule of law is probably   8
more basic than privatization. Privatization is meaningless if you don’t have the rule of law. 
What does it mean to privatize if you do not have security of property, if you can’t use your 
property as you want to?” (Friedman 2002: xviii). Shock therapy advocates now agreed with 
gradualists that various “initial conditions” played a role in explaining the variation in economic 
performance. That is, some countries were predisposed to restructuring their economies more 
effectively and achieving competitiveness on globalized markets because of their particular 
historical and cultural legacies. 
 
Proposition 1: Faster and more extensive privatization led to better performance 
Despite this concession, shock therapists continued to assert that faster and more extensive 
reforms lead to better performance, and therefore claimed that their initial theories were not in 
need of fundamental revision. Instead, they argued that variation in performance could be 
explained by a combination of initial conditions and insufficient implementation of reforms. The 
seminal statement of this position can be found in the EBRD’s 1999 Transition Report: Ten 
Years of Transition, which became part of a growing body of empirical studies supporting these 
claims (see also De Melo and Gelb 1996; Sachs 1996; De Melo, Denizer, and Gelb 1996; De 
Melo et al. 2001). This view emphasized corruption as a key factor in undermining reforms, 
especially in the case of Russia (e.g. Åslund 1999). Although it was acknowledged that “the 
benefits of privatization are larger in countries with an effective legal framework and secure 
property rights” (IMF 2000: 105), the shock therapists never considered privatization 
detrimental, and argued that countries are “better off after the flawed privatizations they carried 
out than they would have been had they avoided or delayed divestiture” (Nellis 2008: 81). 
Supporting this position, two econometric analyses claim that voucher privatization has been   9
beneficial to growth (Bennet et al. 2004; 2007). In sum, the original proponents of shock therapy 
would advocate the same strategy again: “No country has suffered from too radical reforms. 
Things have gone wrong because the move to the market was not radical enough” (Åslund 2002: 
445). 
 
Proposition 2: Privatization failed to create necessary governance institutions  
 
Gradualist scholars felt equally vindicated. Nobel laureate Joseph Stiglitz’s seminal paper 
“Whither Reform? – Ten Year of the Transition” (2000), for example, argued that prioritizing 
privatization over establishing a proper institutional framework promoted widespread corruption. 
Due to information asymmetries and lack of an effective governance framework, the new private 
owners had both incentive and opportunity to pursue rent-seeking and asset-stripping; Stiglitz 
claimed that these tendencies were exacerbated by the liberalization of capital accounts, which 
facilitated transferring money abroad. Strict monetary policy further encouraged predatory 
behavior, as high interest rates prevented new firm owners from attracting the capital needed for 
restructuring. Unless accompanied by adequate institutional reforms, privatization would 
therefore lead to lower economic growth.  
Other gradualists claimed that rapid liberalization generated supply shocks in “structurally 
distorted” industries that had received subsidies and protection under socialism (Popov 2007). 
Rapidly eliminating subsidies and deregulating prices left firms in these sectors with insufficient 
time to restructure, thus driving them out of business or into the barter economy. Because some 
investment capital would have been generated by the savings of these non-competitive firms had 
they remained protected, overall investment levels plummeted. Slower liberalization would have 
limited this decline, thus mitigating the severity of the economic downturn (Popov 2007).    10
Several sociologists have advanced similar arguments, substituting the term “state” for 
“institutions.” Burawoy (1996) and Nee (2000) argued that the state’s bureaucratic capacity was 
a crucial factor in determining economic success or failure. Burawoy (1996), in a seminal article 
comparing the transitions of China and Russia, argued that Russia performed poorly because 
neoliberal reforms damaged the state right when the economy was being privatized, thereby 
creating the perverse combination of private property with soft budget-constraints. This resulted 
in “economic involution,” a process in which firm managers failed to utilize state subsidies to 
increase production, opting instead to pursue asset-stripping and transfer wealth out of the 
economy. In China, conversely, the state was able to decentralize property relations to the local 
administrative level, thereby hardening budget constraints (Walder 1995). Nee (2000) advances 
the broader argument that China’s evolutionary transition strategy permitted reformers to utilize 
preexisting state structures to build a market economy, whereas Russia’s attempt to 
simultaneously reform economic and political institutions deprived policymakers of their 
governance tools.  
 
Proposition 3: Initial conditions, rather than reform paths, were main determinants of economic 
outcomes 
One group of authors claimed that the only relevant factor in explaining performance was the 
respective starting point of different countries (Stuart and Panayotopoulos 1999; Popov 2000; 
Ganev 2007). Popov (2000), for example, argued that democracy without the rule of law creates 
massive opportunities for corruption, thereby undermining subsequent reform efforts. Fish 
(2005) contended that Russia’s natural resource wealth, coupled with its weak legislature and 
delayed economic reforms, further spurred corruption and prevented the emergence of viable   11
governance institutions. Other scholars have emphasized the importance of social structural 
factors, particularly the power of the former nomenklatura. In countries where the nomenklatura 
were sufficiently powerful, they were able to convert their social and political capital into private 
economic wealth (Eyal et al. 1998; King 2003), and in the process, deliberately destroy the 
institutions that prevent economic crimes (Ganev 2007). The outcome was a form of capitalism 
driven by agents with an inappropriate habitus: since their wealth had largely been obtained by 
illegal means and might be subject to future dispossession, former nomenklatura were 
incentivized to transfer capital abroad instead of investing it in their enterprises. 
A variant of the social structural perspective stresses the importance of alliances between 
firm managers and foreign capital in facilitating successful firm restructuring (King 2000; 2001a; 
2001b; 2002). Countries that managed to attract sufficient foreign direct investment (FDI) were 
able to compensate for the depressive effects of shock therapy. Subsequent work combined this 
assessment with the view that neoliberal policies were detrimental, arguing that countries in 
which the nomenklatura struck a bargain with enterprise managers (e.g. Russia) effectively 
discouraged FDI, and ultimately experienced de-industrialization (King 2003; King and Szelényi 
2005). In other countries (mostly in Central Europe), an alliance of technocrats and dissidents 
was able to block the nomenklatura’s bid to gain ownership of the means of production, and 
instead created the political and social conditions for large-scale foreign investment (King 2002; 
King and Szelényi 2005; King and Sznajder 2006). This perspective argues that FDI, combined 
with state-guided enterprise restructuring, accounts for the success stories of post-communist 
development. While these social structural explanations have substantial merit, they nonetheless 
cannot account for differences in performance among countries with similar social structural 
conditions. In particular, they cannot explain intra-FSU or intra-CEE variation.    12
 
A STATE-CENTERED THEORY OF TRANSITION 
In this paper, we advance a neo-Weberian theory of post-communist economic collapse that 
focuses on the bureaucratic character and capacity of the state. For Weber, modern rational 
capitalism was characterized not only by capitalist property relations (private ownership of the 
major means of production), but also by the presence of a strong bureaucratic state (Weber 
1958a: 81; Weber 1958b: 221). In this view, modern states hold the monopoly on legitimate 
violence within their territories, a monopoly on issuing money, and a monopoly on taxing the 
population. The bureaucratic nature of modern states is created by the separation of the office 
from the officeholder and the use of formal rules in decision-making (Weber 1978). Therefore, 
the rights of the office as well as the material goods it commands cannot be used at the discretion 
of the officeholder, especially not for their personal gain. Weber believed that bureaucracies 
functioned well when they had an educated staff with an esprit de corps and sufficient material 
resources. When we speak of a “strong” state in this paper, we then mean a state that has what 
Mann termed “infrastructural power” (1986): the ability to penetrate society and realize its 
objectives.  
A bureaucratic state is essential to modern capitalism because in its absence, individual 
capitalists might resort to “political capitalism” – the use of personal relationships with state 
officials to create extra-market opportunities for profitable activity (Weber 1966: 246-247; 1978: 
164-166). In this scenario, sustained innovation and specialization are neglected, as capitalists 
circumvent market competition by pursuing “political accumulation” and strengthening their ties 
to government officials instead of carrying out productive investments. In addition, Weber 
recognized the essential role of strong nation-states in supporting capitalist growth by protecting   13
and nurturing infant industries. Many other authors have emphasized the importance of states in 
providing fertile conditions for economic growth through the creation and maintenance of 
institutions, including an adequate legal and regulatory framework, counter-cyclical demand 
stimulation, reliable information diffusion, a skilled and healthy workforce, and new technology 
development (for a review see Block and Evans 2005). 
Our theoretical account is directly at odds with neoliberal explanations, since we argue that 
the closer a given country’s policies approximated the neoliberal goal of mass privatization, the 
worse its subsequent economic performance. This explanation is consistent with the 
institutionalist and corruption-centered perspectives, but goes beyond them by arguing that mass 
privatization itself damaged existing state institutions and increased corruption. We contribute to 
the (sociological) statist and social structural accounts by identifying an important mechanism 
responsible for the deleterious outcomes experienced by many transition societies: mass 
privatization leading to declining state revenues.  
Countries which pursued mass privatization severely damaged their state capacity in two 
ways. First, privatization eliminated the profits of state-owned enterprises as a source of state 
revenue. Second, it created enterprises lacking strategic owners, which prompted severe agency 
problems, increasing the risk of firm failure, recourse to the non-monetary economy, and non-
payment of taxes. The combined impact on the state’s budget led to a fiscal crisis, which 
weakened the development of the very institutions needed for governing the private sector, and 
undermined morale among the post-Soviet bureaucracy. Declining state capacity – fiscally and 
bureaucratically – promoted corruption and weak institutions, both of which contributed 
significantly to poor economic outcomes. The result was a vicious cycle of mutual reinforcement   14
between a failing state and a failing economy. We contrast this theoretical logic with the 
neoliberal account in Figure 2.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
 
HYPOTHESES 
Our theoretical framework implies that mass privatization programs exert both direct and indirect 
effects on post-communist state capacity. In the following section, we develop specific 
hypotheses concerning each causal pathway and contrast them with competing predictions. 
 
The Direct Effects of Mass Privatization on State Capacity 
We argue that a post-socialist country’s choice to rapidly privatize its enterprise holdings 
immediately reduced that state’s financial capacity, due to the high budgetary dependence on the 
earnings of state-owned firms. Advocates of neoliberal policies did not expect this fiscal shock to 
be particularly devastating for two reasons. First, it was believed that socialist states had been 
engaging in “value-subtracting” behavior by expending vast amounts of resources to prop up 
inefficient firms producing unneeded goods (Gaddy and Ickes 2002). Radical privatization 
therefore had the potential to generate huge savings for the state. Second, rising tax revenues 
from the superior growth of de novo private firms and the improving performance of privatized 
state enterprises were expected to compensate for revenue shortfalls. 
 
Indirect Effects of Mass Privatization on State Capacity 
In order to avoid a state fiscal crisis as a result of mass privatization, the enterprise sector 
would have to grow and be taxed effectively. We argue that mass privatization accomplished   15
precisely the opposite: worse enterprise performance coupled with a declining capacity of the 
state to tax firms. 
Mass privatization programs, by design, led to greatly dispersed firm ownership. The new 
owners had only limited incentive to monitor firms, and more importantly, lacked the capacity to 
exercise control over managers and employees (Ellerman 1998). McDermott (2002) 
demonstrated that in the Czech Republic mass privatization greatly complicated corporate 
governance, causing assets to go unutilized because of ambiguous ownership situations, which 
discouraged foreigners from investing.
3 Well-functioning regulatory and credit rating agencies or 
an independent business press may have mitigated the violation of shareholder rights, yet these 
institutions did not exist. 
In most cases, newly mass privatized firms were cut off from state subsidies. Unlike firms 
privatized to strategic owners, however, they did not have access to resources such as investment 
capital, new managerial talent, and marketing networks, which would have been crucial for 
restructuring overstaffed and inefficient Soviet-era factories into globally competitive firms 
(King 2003). Faced with this situation, owners, managers, and workers, unable to work 
cooperatively for the betterment of their firms, tended to pursue short-term parasitic strategies to 
accumulate wealth, such as asset stripping. Thus, firms that were oftentimes already 
technologically obsolete now faced substantial external shocks and major internal problems. 
One way in which firms responded to these multiple crises was by reviving the practice of 
barter, which had evolved under the planning system to rectify deficiencies in the central 
allocation of resources (Kornai 1980). Failing post-communist firms retreated to non-market 
mechanisms of exchange. They bartered and tolerated arrears from their customers, in turn 
failing to pay their suppliers and creating chains of inter-enterprise debt. They produced goods   16
for the black market to avoid taxation, oftentimes falling behind on tax payments for legally 
produced goods. Some firms even started using non-official money printed up by local 
governments. In effect, firms began to flout the government’s monopoly on the creation of 
money and the taxation of the economy (Woodruff 2000). We refer to these micro-strategies as 
“non-market” restructuring, which we distinguish from market-oriented strategies of developing 
new product lines, gaining quality accreditations, and increasing sales. These latter are typical of 
firms in Western capitalism and generate more economic value for future taxation than non-
market activities. Furthermore, non-market transactions are much harder to tax than normal 
monetary transactions. Firm-level responses to mass privatization thus further strained the state’s 
resources.  
The resulting fiscal crisis meant that the state was increasingly unable to pay its own staff. 
Undercompensated government bureaucrats were easily corrupted, providing favors and 
advantages to businessmen in exchange for bribes or other unofficial payments (Pappe 2000; 
Reddaway and Glinski 2001). In “patrimonial capitalism”, as Szelényi and his collaborators 
called it, personal ties between economic and political actors replace bureaucratic organization 
(Eyal et al. 1998; King 2002; King 2003; King and Szelényi 2005). 
Based on the above considerations, we specify the following: 
H1: Mass privatization reduces state capacity. 
H2: Mass privatization reduces economic growth. 
H3: Mass privatized firms are more likely to use non-monetary exchanges and owe the 
government tax arrears. 
H4: Mass privatized firms are less likely to have pursued market-oriented restructuring than 
state-owned firms.   17
All hypotheses are single-tailed. In each case, the null hypothesis is specified as mass 
privatization having no effect on the response variable. 
 
METHODS 
Our analysis uses a multi-level approach, incorporating both country- and firm-level data. 
This enables us to address fallacies that could arise both from the analysis of national-level data 
(overlooking mechanisms) and individual-level data (overlooking system-wide processes). 
Simultaneously, it allows us to model the causal mechanisms by which the effects of 
privatization on firms affect the state, and the effects of privatization on the state affect firms.  
Cross-national data: On the national level, we report time-series and cross-sectional models 
using data on the social, economic, and political development of 26 post-communist countries, 
drawn from the World Bank World Development Indicators Database (2008 edition). In addition, 
we generated a novel measure of mass privatization based on historical records, including those 
reported in the Transition Report series (EBRD 1994-2005). Table 1 summarizes the variables 
used in the cross-national models. We first analyze the entire sample of countries (Tables 3 and 
4). However, given the historical differences between the satellite countries and the core 
republics of the FSU, we also provide separate analyses for the non-FSU and FSU blocks of 
countries (see Online Supplement E). We restricted our study to the period between 1990 and 
2000. The starting point is justifiable in view of missing data for many countries in 1989 (several 
post-Soviet countries also did not yet exist). By the late 1990s, the transitional recession was 
over in all countries of the post-communist world, and a new set of political and economic 
dynamics had emerged to create what Szelényi and Wilk (2009) termed the “Second Transition” 
(involving the reform of social institutions such as the education and health sectors). Moreover,   18
while there has been substantial path-dependence in the region, this dependence is not absolute, 
and both political and economic developments are increasingly driven by other factors – for 
instance, the change in relative prices following Russia’s sovereign debt default and devaluation 
in 1998, the strong rise in oil and other commodity prices from the late 1990s onwards, or the 
most recent global financial meltdown, which affected the post-communist economies very 
unevenly. We therefore end our time series in 2000 (although extending it did not affect our 
statistical findings).  
Two variables require further discussion: our measures of privatization and of state capacity. 
Almost all existing analyses of privatization in the post-communist world use the EBRD’s 
indices of privatization progress. While we show that our results are robust to the use of these 
variables, we note that the EBRD measures are of limited analytical value since they do not 
distinguish between different privatization methods. Moreover, as demonstrated by Stuckler, 
King and Patton (2009), the residuals of a regression of these indicators on growth are non-
random, and are predicted by prior economic growth (implying that EBRD bureaucrats coded 
economically successful countries as being more effective privatizers than they actually were).  
Therefore, in addition to investigating the commonly used EBRD indices, we construct a 
measure to reflect as accurately as possible the actual implementation of large-scale mass 
privatization programs, by specifying whether a given country implemented a mass privatization 
program covering at least 25% of its large enterprise sector.
4 Ideally, we would have used data 
on the rate of privatization for each country, as both the number of existing firms (denominator) 
and the number of privatized firms (numerator) were changing. However, inconsistencies in 
government reporting of privatization and firm data to the international financial institutions 
made the calculation of such a rate impossible for many countries. According to staff members at   19
the EBRD, the texts of its Transition Report series provide the entirety of the organization’s data 
on privatization, reporting the public and private sector shares in several different ways: total 
assets of firms, total number of firms, and percent of total employment. All of these measures 
have advantages and disadvantages, but they are not commensurate. Online Supplement C 
reports our own best estimates of post-communist privatization, along with our coding decisions 
for each country. We confirmed the coding of our variable with the senior official overseeing 
mass privatization implementation at the World Bank, Ira Lieberman, who agreed with our 
coding of countries’ privatization programs with the possible exception of Romania.  
Constructing valid and reliable measures of the bureaucratic nature of the state or of state 
capacity is notoriously difficult. We use a variety of subjective measures of state capacity 
aggregated from firm-level survey data (perception of government efficiency, property rights 
enforcement and contract security, and prevalence of corruption), as well as an objective 
measure for the time-series analysis (total government spending). Comparative studies frequently 
measure state capacity by expressing government spending as a percentage of GDP. This is 
sensible, but it assumes that there are no significant changes in the denominator during the period 
under investigation; given the significant economic contraction experienced by most countries in 
the post-communist world, this approach is not reasonable for the purpose of our study. In 
Russia, for instance, changes in the ratio of government spending to GDP were driven partially 
by deliberate attempts to reduce the size of government, but primarily by the rise of the shadow 
economy and the inability of the state to collect taxes (Popov 2004: 2). Given these 
complications, we followed existing literature in measuring state fiscal capacity by considering 
changes in total government spending over the course of the transition. 
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Firm-level data: Our firm-level data are taken from the World Bank/EBRD Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) of 4,106 large and medium firms in 
26 transition economies. Conducted between 1999 and 2000, it examines key aspects of 
governance and institutional support provided by the state; areas covered by the survey include 
business regulation and taxation, the legal and judicial system, infrastructure, and financial 
services (World Bank 2011). Specifically, BEEPS assesses how “the growth of firms, including 
their decisions to invest and to innovate, and the growth of firms’ revenues and productivity are 
affected by the functioning of government institutions, financial markets, and physical 
infrastructure (ibid.). The survey is based on face-to-face interviews with firm managers and 
owners. It was designed to generate comparative measurements in areas such as corruption, state 
capture, lobbying, and quality of the business environment, and also reports a series of specific 
firm characteristics and performance measures. One strength of the survey in measuring 
corruption is its emphasis on the experience of service-users and managers, rather than the 
perceptions of experts and households. (The latter two have been found to generate a significant 
positive growth bias in studies of economic performance [see Kurtz and Schrank 2007, Knack 
2007]). The survey includes about 125 randomly sampled firms from each country, with larger 
samples for Poland and Ukraine (over 200 firms), and an even larger sample for Russia (over 
500). Of the firms surveyed, 16% were privatized, 14 % were state-owned, and the remaining 
70% were new private firms (World Bank 2011). Serbia and Turkey were excluded from our 
study, leaving a sample of 3,891 firms, of which 3,550 had complete data on the factors of 
interest. 
If a firm was privatized in a country that we coded as having implemented a mass 
privatization program and this firm reported no foreign investment, we treat it as having been   21
privatized via mass privatization. This creates a conservative bias in the variable, as many such 
firms were not in fact privatized by this method in mass-privatizing countries (see Online 
Supplements B and C). Firms privatized by other methods likely suffered from much less severe 
principal-agent problems (e.g. if they were privatized directly to firm insiders), or at least had 
access to new capital and markets (e.g. if they were acquired by a strategic owner) (King 2001b). 
Tables 1 and 2 describe the variables used in the cross-national and firm-level regressions; all 
equations and further details about our modeling framework are provided in Online Supplement 
D. 
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here] 
RESULTS OF THE CROSS-NATIONAL ANALYSIS 
Table 3 shows the results of our regressions of three subjective indicators of a strong 
bureaucratic state on mass privatization and several controls (transition policies, resource wealth, 
military conflict, demographic factors, membership in the FSU and initial transition conditions). 
We found that the aggregated survey respondents from countries undertaking mass privatization 
were more likely to believe that the government was inefficient (Model 1), would not protect 
property rights or contracts (Model 2), and would be more prone to rely on unofficial payments 
to public officials (Model 3).  
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Comparing Satellite and Core countries of the Former Soviet Union  
Table 4 reports our regression results for the full sample of countries over time. We can see 
that countries which underwent mass privatization, ceteris paribus, exhibited about 20% lower 
government spending than those that did not (Models 5-6). Countries which liberalized prices 
also displayed substantially lower levels of government spending. Because government spending   22
is a component of GDP, we would expect that GDP declined by the amount attributable to mass 
privatization multiplied by the fraction of government spending in GDP. We found that mass-
privatizing countries experienced, on average, a greater than 16% decrease in GDP per capita 
(Models 8-9). Price liberalization had a similar-sized negative effect, corroborating a finding by 
Popov (2007). 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
Online Supplement E (Table E1) presents the results of our regressions of government 
spending on mass privatization using the split sample. We find that in FSU countries mass 
privatization was associated with a 22.8% drop in real government spending per capita during 
the 1992-2000 period (Model 12). Not surprisingly, oil is linked to greater government spending 
(capturing the spike in oil prices during the late 1990s). Similarly, greater democratization 
implied an average increase in government spending per capita of 4.82% among FSU countries 
(p = 0.008) but had no effect among non-FSU countries (β = -4.31, p = 0.39). We found no 
statistically significant effect for mass privatization in the non-FSU countries once controls were 
implemented (Model 15). Price liberalization, however, did have a negative effect in this region. 
Given that the average increase in the EBRD liberalization score for non-FSU countries was 1.97 
(range 0-4), this is substantial. 
Online Supplement E further presents the results of our random-effects regressions of real 
GDP per capita on mass privatization (Table E2). We find that privatization was associated with 
a 13.1% drop in real GDP per capita (Model 18), supporting the notion that mass privatization 
negatively affected growth through a reduction in state fiscal capacity, without a simultaneous 
compensation in benefits to investment, consumption, or exports. When holding constant trends 
in government spending, thus effectively blocking the mass privatization-state capacity-growth   23
channel, we found no effect of mass privatization on growth among FSU countries (β=-5.01, 
p=0.24; full results not reported).  
 
Robustness Checks 
We performed a series of robustness checks on our cross-national findings. First, we 
removed potential outliers according to a liberal definition of standard deviations in the residuals 
of greater than |2| (dropping Armenia in 1992, 1993, and 2000; Azerbaijan in 1992; Georgia in 
1991 and 1994; and Tajikistan in 1991), finding that the coefficients for mass privatization 
increased (β=-17.2, p<0.001). Second, we introduced a set of country dummies, which left our 
coefficients for mass privatization unchanged. Third, we replicated our cross-national results 
using the EBRD index of privatization, producing results consistent with the findings reported in 
Online Supplement F, Table F1. In light of these robustness checks, the cross-national evidence 
supports our neo-Weberian theory linking mass privatization to declines in state capacity and 
growth.  
 
RESULTS OF THE FIRM-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
For the micro-analysis we adopt the modeling strategy used in King and Sznajder (2006). We 
consider multiple indicators of firm performance and control for variables commonly used in 
firm-level analysis, all of which are summarized in Table 2.  
Table 5 presents our firm-level results. Enterprises privatized to domestic owners in countries 
that implemented mass privatization programs were 78% more likely to engage in barter than 
state-owned firms (Model 22), and 56% more likely to have overdue taxes (Model 30). They 
were also 41% less likely to have invested (Model 24), 36% less likely to have increased sales 
(Model 26), 58% less likely to have hired new employees (Model 28), 36% less likely to have   24
developed a new product line (Model 32), and 26% less likely to have upgraded existing 
products (Model 34). Conversely, foreign-invested firms were 62% less likely to have engaged 
in barter (Model 22), and 53% less likely to have owed taxes (Model 30). Our micro-level 
findings are thus consistent with the results from the cross-national analysis, indicating that 
adverse outcomes were significantly more prevalent among the firms we treat as having been 
mass privatized, whereas privatization to foreign owners (likely strategic investors) had positive 
effects on firm performance. 
[Insert Table 5 here] 
 
The Political Economy of Mass Privatization and Potential Endogeneity 
It is conceivable that our country- and firm-level results are misleading because of a “sick 
patient” effect. That is, countries with weak states might have chosen mass privatization because 
they lacked the capacity to implement any other method of privatization. If these countries were 
going to suffer negative consequences regardless of their privatization strategy, the detrimental 
effects we attribute to mass privatization might simply be the result of an underlying lack of state 
capacity and thus be unrelated to the method of privatization.  
We assessed the possibility of a “sick-patient” effect by reviewing the existing literature on 
the political economy of mass privatization. The leading historical accounts of property reform in 
the post-socialist world, as well as a large body of single-country case-study research, indicate 
that privatization strategies were politically motivated outcomes of conflicts among elites and, 
sometimes, other interest groups. Significantly, the choice to mass privatize was not 
predetermined by a weak state or any other structural feature (for Russia see Klebnikov 2000; 
Medvedev 2000; Reddaway and Glinski 2001). A glance at the regional diversity of privatization   25
strategies supports this claim, as mass privatization was adopted by countries in every region of 
the post-communist world, from the authoritarian states of Central Asia, to the “managed 
democracies” of the European FSU, to the liberal democracies of Central Europe.  
While space does not permit a detailed discussion of the political economy of mass 
privatization for all cases, we cite analyses for ten post-socialist countries that implemented mass 
privatization programs, which consistently suggest that privatization was driven by political 
motives (including ethnic, fiscal, anti-Russian, and interest group politics). We also provide a 
detailed discussion of the Russian case, given that country’s regional importance and former 
political centrality. These materials can be found in Online Supplement G. 
Thus, the majority of scholars familiar with privatization strategies in the post-communist 
world agree that mass privatization was chosen not because the state lacked the capacity to 
implement alternative methods, but because of political motives – in particular, the desire to 
break the power of anti-reform coalitions and make the transition irreversible.
5 Indeed, it surely 
would have been easier to leave large enterprises under state ownership indefinitely, until an 
acceptable strategic owner emerged, as governments did in Belarus, Slovenia, Uzbekistan and 
Poland.  
Although policy choices do partially depend on initial circumstances, notions of historical 
causality in which such decisions are strictly determined by structural forces fell out of 
sociological favor decades ago. Virtually the entire field of political and historical sociology has 
strongly rejected structural analysis that has no place for contingency and agency in explaining 
historical outcomes (see e.g. Moore Jr. 1978; Zeitlin 1984; for a review of trends in historical 
sociology, see Clemens 2007). Therefore, positing that a certain radical and innovative   26
privatization program which was controversial and fiercely contested was inevitable strikes us as 
implausible.  
Nonetheless, we investigated this possibility statistically by testing whether a range of 
commonly used “initial conditions”, including four measures of state capacity, are associated 
with the adoption of mass privatization programs (see Online Supplement H, Table H1). The 
only statistically significant finding relates to government transparency and points in the opposite 
direction (i.e. more transparent states were more likely to adopt mass privatization programs).  
Next, we turned to evaluating a series of common hypotheses proposed in the literature to 
explain underlying causes of why some countries adopted mass privatization but others did not: 
regional diffusion, ethnic politicking, and pressure from international creditors. As shown in the 
probit model reproduced in Online Supplement H (Table H2), countries were more likely to 
pursue mass privatization if they were members of the FSU (about three times more likely – a 
regional diffusion effect); displayed greater degrees of ethno-linguistic fractionalization (both 
undermining civil society resistance and incentivizing domestic elites to use mass privatization to 
oust ethnic Russians from privileged managerial positions); had greater levels of democratic 
participation (used to legitimate the new regime and to consolidate democracy); and had 
borrowed from the IMF in the previous year (pressure from external actors). 
Overall, these findings are consistent with our understanding of privatization as a political 
decision, driven by domestic reformers aiming to legitimate new regimes or weaken political 
opponents, and in part facilitated by foreign actors. 
Based on these models we construct a new variable assessing the “hazard of implementing 
mass privatization”. This approach captures both the observable factors which increased the 
likelihood of pursuing this policy (described above), as well as unobservable factors (obtained   27
from the error term). In a second step, we added this control to our main equations for estimating 
the effect of mass privatization on GDP. As shown in Online Supplement I, the effect we 
recorded was even larger than our original estimates (-42.7%, p<0.001), indicating that those 
factors which predisposed countries to implement mass privatization would have been associated 
with higher GDP if mass privatization had not been implemented.  
In sum, we found there to be neither historical nor statistical evidence indicating a greater 
propensity among weak states to adopt mass privatization as a property reform strategy. Even if 
this hypothesis were true, our findings would still demonstrate that mass privatization 
contributed to a further weakening of state capacity via enterprise failure and reduced tax 
revenue. Even if weak states had been more likely to rely on mass privatization, choosing this 
method inflicted further damage on their state capacity (as can be inferred from our firm-level 
findings). 
 
Political Economy of Firm Selection for Privatization 
There is also potential for a selection bias acting at the firm-level. Countries implementing 
mass privatization programs may have selectively privatized weak and underperforming firms. 
As a result, any effect associated with privatization may simply reflect that bias. To address this 
possibility, we review evidence showing that: i) valid information on firm performance was 
unavailable, making firm selection based on performance very unlikely; ii) as a corollary, 
comparative firm-level data on pre-privatization conditions do not exist across countries; iii) to 
the extent firm selection may have occurred, there is evidence that firms were chosen on a 
sector-wide basis rather than firm-specific one; and iv) in the limited cases where within-sector 
firm selection occurred, better performing firms tended to be privatized first.   28
First, to our knowledge, no firm-level dataset in existence contains the information on pre-
privatization conditions needed to address the issue of potential endogeneity of firm selection on 
a cross-national basis. For the theoretical and empirical reasons described below, we also believe 
that it would be very difficult, if not altogether impossible, to construct such a dataset. 
In theory, to capture initial firm conditions, one must accurately assess the value of fixed 
capital for individual firms, which could be used to predict a firm’s competitiveness in a 
liberalized market. In practice, however, accurate and detailed firm-by-firm data did not exist 
prior to privatization, as socialist central planners were generally not well-informed about the 
resources of individual enterprises (see Szelényi, Beckett and King 1994 for a review of the 
literature). Bauer (1983) describes the “plan bargain” – a system of organizational arrangements 
in which managers had economic incentives to stockpile resources and conceal information from 
central planners (see the seminal work of Kornai 1980). In the period leading up to privatization, 
the partial marketization of the perestroika reforms engendered further information asymmetries, 
as managers began to set up separate corporate vehicles for the purpose of asset-stripping (e.g. 
Medvedev 2000; Ganev 2007). In some cases, managers and firm insiders undervalued firms by 
falsifying records, permitting them to buy the firm via privatization at a bargain price. Given this 
combination of factors, it is thus highly unlikely that states would have been able to use detailed 
information on firm performance as a criterion for firm selection. The Czech Center for Coupon 
Privatization, for example, published information on the firms to be included in mass 
privatization with the explicit caveat that “much of the data [are] of dubious quality and may not 
be relevant in a rapidly changing economic situation” (Shafik 1995: 1144). 
The greatest obstacle to constructing a suitable dataset, however, is the inherent difficulty in 
using market economy performance evaluation criteria to measure the performance of firms prior   29
to privatization. Although accounting records of late-socialist state enterprises included metrics 
of revenues, costs, profit, and productivity, these data cannot be analyzed through the 
“performance” lens used to evaluate firms in a free-market economy. As Held and Hill (1989) 
note in a study of the Soviet economy, “[s]tate-owned firms realise a money surplus only when 
the relation between the state-decreed purchase and sales prices allows for it. They are not free to 
employ the techniques of competition vis-à-vis sellers and buyers” (31).  
Given these inherent limitations in the available data, few existing firm-level studies have 
attempted to statistically address potential endogeneity of performance-based selection for 
privatization. Djankov and Murrell (2002), who conducted a meta-analysis of the existing 
research on privatization and firm restructuring, report that half of the more than one hundred 
studies surveyed do not mention the issue of endogeneity at all. Hanousek et al. (2007) – who 
represent, to our knowledge, the first dataset designed to control for endogeneity, using firm-
level initial (pre-privatization) conditions in a study of the Czech Republic – also note in their 
literature review that many studies “have not been able to control adequately for endogeneity of 
ownership [firms not being selected for privatization at random]”, and that of those which do, 
“many treat the issue in a relatively haphazard way” (2-3). 
Since we cannot address firm selection statistically, endogeneity remains a logical 
possibility, albeit we believe an unlikely one. Mass privatization, by design, did not occur on a 
case-by-case basis but instead followed a sectoral strategy. As Lieberman (1997) explains in the 
introduction to a World Bank volume on the experience of mass privatization in transition 
economies: 
Mass privatization is largely a systems approach to privatization. ... The programs usually 
start with a selection process – for example, all medium-size and large enterprises in the 
tradables sector except very large or ‘strategic’ enterprises … (2). 
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Studies evaluating the determinants of privatization confirm that mass privatization was typically 
carried out on a sectoral basis. In a study of Russian mass privatization, for example, Nureev and 
Runov (2002) compare lists of enterprises not subject to voucher privatization (by industry) at 
different points in time and infer from changes in these lists a desire of officials to privatize the 
most “delicate” enterprises last (i.e. assets in the oil, energy, chemical and petrochemical, 
aviation, and nuclear sectors).
6 To the extent that sequencing occurred, a bias would have thus 
operated across sectors (e.g. privatizing agriculture early, but delaying manufacturing), for 
which we are able to control in our analysis by using firm-sector dummy variables.  
To the extent there was variation in privatization within sectors, existing research 
indicates suggests that “better” firms were privatized first. That is, some countries selectively 
delayed privatization of the largest, most interlinked state-owned enterprises (considered “too big 
to fail”) but rapidly privatized smaller and more dynamic firms (King 2000). Gupta et al. (2008), 
in a recent analysis of government priorities and firm sequencing in the Czech mass privatization 
program, report “strong evidence that the Czech government privatized first firms that were more 
profitable” (204). Szentpéteri and Telegdy (2010) report similar results in a study of Romanian 
mass privatization, though they note that an overarching objective of the government in selecting 
firms was employment preservation, outweighing even potential efficiency gains from 
privatization. To our knowledge, no existing research or data have suggested that the firms with 
the least potential were selectively privatized under mass privatization programs. 
As a final robustness check, we used the statistical method of constructing a measure of the 
“hazard of privatization” described above but applied to the firm-level. Again, we use a two-step 
procedure: first we estimate the probability that a firm was privatized based on a set of observed 
characteristics of the firm, including its performance. Then, we use this model to combine both   31
observed and unobserved characteristics into a new variable, the hazard of privatization, and 
incorporate it into the models assessing the relationship between privatization and firm 
performance. As shown in Online Supplement J, none of our earlier results were qualitatively 
altered and, in the case of barter, became stronger, as those firms with greater underlying hazard 
of privatization were found to have lower risks of negative outcomes. This finding is consistent 
with existing scholarship on firm selection and further suggests that any unobserved firm-
selection bias was in the opposite direction of our hypothesis. 
 
DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS 
Based on country- and firm-level evidence, our analysis indicates that mass privatization 
negatively affected state capacity via two central mechanisms. Mass privatization directly 
weakened the state’s revenue base, and that this decline was not offset by enterprise growth 
because, as we demonstrate, mass privatization also had negative effects on the business 
environment. While the available data on state capacity are limited, we employed six different 
measures in our analysis. Using cross-national longitudinal data, we show that mass privatization 
created a fiscal shock to the state that significantly diminished government revenues and 
spending. We also determined on the basis of firm-level data that mass privatization negatively 
affected state capacity in three areas: government inefficiency, unofficial payments/bribery, and 
weakened protection of property rights. Finally, we present evidence that privatized firms were 
more likely to rely on barter and accumulate tax arrears, both of which indicate a weakened 
capacity of the state to maintain control of its own fiscal and monetary system. 
These findings contrast with the neoliberal prediction that mass privatization would both 
promote firm restructuring and combat weak corporate governance, ultimately leading to   32
stronger growth. They are, however, consistent with the leading post-mortem explanations (by 
both economists and sociologists) insofar as weak institutions and poor governance were major 
causes of the post-communist economic recession. Our model goes beyond this understanding by 
showing that the capacity of post-communist states, itself contingent on domestic policy choices, 
played a crucial role in determining subsequent economic performance. Thus, while we agree 
with sociological work emphasizing the centrality of the state, we are isolating the fiscal effects 
of mass privatization as a key mechanism producing poor economic and political performance.  
Our results also support the gradualist and statist critiques of rapid liberalization, as well as 
social structural analyses emphasizing the importance of FDI. Though not a central focus of this 
paper, in many of our models, the EBRD liberalization index had a large negative effect on both 
government spending and GDP growth. There also seems to be some evidence for the beneficial 
effects of FDI in the micro-data: foreign-invested firms bartered less and paid their taxes more 
promptly than domestic-owned companies. Including FDI as a percent of GDP into the 
regression models had no effect (results not reported), as foreign investment was simply not 
prevalent enough in mass-privatizing countries to make a difference. Indeed, mass privatization 
was viewed by its designers as an alternative to waiting for foreign investors, who were expected 
to be hesitant to invest in gigantic Soviet-era combines during a time of considerable political 
and economic uncertainty. Thus, the decision to mass privatize was at the same time a decision 
not to rely on FDI. 
One limitation of our study is that, while we have documented the effects of mass 
privatization on a variety of measures of state capacity at the national and firm levels, we did not 
further model the causal chain to demonstrate the effect of state capacity on economic growth 
(beyond a direct effect on lower government spending, which, by design, is a substantial   33
component of GDP). However, as noted above, there has been a growing recognition among 
both social scientists and policy-makers that state capacity is a crucial determinant of, and 
precondition for, balanced economic growth – a trend also reflected in recent policy reports of 
the World Bank (1997, 2002). Additionally, corroborating our firm-level insights, our macro-
level path analysis supports the hypothesis that the effect of mass privatization on growth 
operated principally through a reduction in state capacity (as measured by per capita spending); 
there is also preliminary evidence from this region that government spending has had 
economically stimulating effects (see endnote).
7 Although we used six indicators of state 
capacity, the enterprise- and country-level measures are limited (especially the fiscal indicators). 
Further studies should attempt to better assess bureaucratic capacity and its variations across 
countries and over time. 
Still, it is conceivable that there exists a potential unobserved “third” factor that accounts for 
the observed link between mass privatization and weakened state capacity. If this hypothesis 
were correct, however, this factor would arguably constitute no more than a distant determinant 
on the causal chain. Given that mass privatization was implemented across sub-regions with 
divergent historical trajectories, it is unlikely that a single underlying factor simultaneously 
affected state capacity and the privatization strategy chosen by different post-socialist 
governments. Our models and a detailed comparative review of the historical cases indicate that 
domestic intra-elite competition, ethnic politics, and regional diffusion all played significant 
roles in determining the method of privatization. At the firm-level, there is also potential for 
selection based on performance, leading to spurious estimates of the effects of privatization. 
However, just as data were unavailable to policy-makers in assessing pre-privatization 
performance and market values of firms (and thus unlikely to have been a major component of   34
selection), so, too, is this information not accessible to researchers today. Where information was 
available, its validity is dubious, as managers and firm insiders with vested interests made 
deliberate attempts to falsify records and undervalue firms in order to purchase them at bargain 
prices. Moreover, mass privatization programs were designed to privatize entire sectors 
(Lieberman 1997) (which we control for using firm-sector dummy variables); to the extent that 
within-sector selection occurred, better-performing firms tended to be privatized earlier in the 
process. Nevertheless, as with nearly any statistical analysis, there is a possibility that both our 
cross-national time series and our firm-level results are subject to endogeneity – in the former 
case due to spurious causality (ecological fallacy), and in the latter case due to selection biases. 
Future research should attempt to refine our understanding of the political economy of mass 
privatization and, in particular, the issue of firm selection. While we do not suggest mass 
privatization was the only factor reducing state capacity, we are confident overall that we have 
demonstrated that it was a key factor undermining state capacity and, as a result, economic 
growth. 
Finally, two unusual country cases merit a brief discussion. The most important outlier of the 
post-communist world, that is, the country that implemented mass privatization according to our 
definition but nonetheless had good overall performance and managed to attract a large amount 
of FDI, is the Czech Republic. The Czech Republic was the second-richest country in the region, 
owed little external debt, had a long and celebrated history of industrial production stemming 
from its time as the economic powerhouse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, had a ready-made 
pre-communist legal tradition of contract and property rights, and a privileged location bordering 
Germany. Still, by 1999, the Czech Republic recorded the worst scores on the protection of 
property rights, government effectiveness, and the rate of growth within Central and Eastern   35
Europe. Case-study data moreover demonstrates that companies privatized through vouchers 
experienced substantial governance problems (King 2001a, 2001b; McDermott 2002), and many 
voucher-privatized firms were in fact renationalized before ultimately being sold to foreign 
investors. 
Another, perhaps less obvious, outlier is China. Although some Chinese reformers did 
consider mass privatization as a policy option in the period leading up to 1989, systematic efforts 
to privatize the country’s medium- and large-scale state enterprises did not begin until about 
1995. We opted to exclude China from our analysis of mass privatization programs but including 
it would have invariably strengthened our statistical findings, given our coding method and the 
fact that China has been the fastest-growing economy in the world and is widely acknowledged 
to have a better-performing state than most other post-Soviet countries (see Burawoy 1996). 
Nonetheless, we include a brief overview of Chinese privatization in Online Supplement G, as 
we believe that it constitutes an illustrative comparative case. 
 
CONCLUSION 
As our findings show, mass privatization programs directly undermined state fiscal 
capability. They also damaged the enterprise sector, and thus indirectly contributed to a further 
weakening of the bureaucratic capacity of the state and its ability to support the institutions 
necessary for a functioning capitalist economy. Rather than accelerating the formation of private 
property and securing a smooth transition to Western-style capitalism, as was intended by 
advocates of mass privatization, these programs precipitated state withdrawal and pushed 
countries in the direction of “crony” or “political” capitalism. A large and growing body of 
empirical evidence shows that a different type of capitalism, emphasizing patron-client ties and a   36
non-bureaucratic state, emerged in parts of the FSU and Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, countries 
that proceeded more gradually in creating a private sector, such as Poland and Slovenia, are now 
much closer to the Western capitalist ideal, with a relative separation of politics and economics 
(for details, see the literature review in King and Szelényi 2005). To be sure, we are not claiming 
that mass privatization is the only path to post-communist patrimonialism (Bulgaria, for instance, 
constitutes a clear case of patrimonial capitalism but did not implement a mass privatization 
program). Yet by contributing to a fiscal crisis and creating severe governance problems, mass 
privatization certainly provided a fertile ground for activities conducive to patrimonialism 
(funneling of assets, official corruption, solicitation of kick-backs, privatizing of the means of 
administration, etc.).  
Of course, there was widespread horizontal corruption during the Soviet era (e.g. gifts or 
informal payments made to service providers), which occurred as a rational response to the 
shortage economy. Prior to privatization, however, it was extremely rare to see vertical 
corruption, such as bribing of police officers (see Reddaway and Glinski 2001). Post-transition, 
the state and the enterprise sector became riddled with patron-client relationships (see King and 
Szelenyi [2005] and Ganev [2007] for a review). Further, while reliable comparative data on 
corruption levels is hard to obtain (given the unobservable nature of successful corruption), 
Popov (2004) finds that various proxy measures (e.g. unofficial payments, barter, homicide and 
crime rates) have recorded dramatic increases since the beginning of the transition. Our analysis 
begins to explain how this further deterioration in governance occurred.  
Our results do not indicate that mass privatization was the only determinant of post-
communist economic performance. We are, however, claiming that it explains a substantial 
amount of the variation in performance. Future analysis might arrive at a more differentiated   37
picture by employing improved measures of other types of transition policies (e.g. price and 
trade liberalization). Undoubtedly, external factors, such as relative prices, are causally important 
as well. Finally, as sociologists we never doubted that “initial conditions” are important, and our 
Hausman-Taylor tests indicate that we have statistically accounted for the most relevant ones in 
our models that were disaggregated into former Soviet core and satellite countries. 
Our findings have several theoretical and policy implications. For sociological theory, our 
analysis supports the position that states and markets are not antagonistic entities as maintained 
by the neoliberal perspective (Block 1994; Evans 1995; Fligstein 2001; Block and Evans 2005). 
It also supports the traditional sociological thesis of the importance of a bureaucratic state for 
successful capitalist development (e.g., Weber 1978; Evans 1995; Evans and Rauch 1999). 
Regarding public policy, our analysis suggests that when designing major economic reforms, 
particularly in the area of private sector development, safe-guarding government revenues and 
state capacity ought to be a high priority. Counting on a future burst of productivity from a 
“restructured” private economy to compensate for declining tax revenues appears a risky 
proposition, given the post-communist experience.  
Our analysis cannot resolve whether neoliberal predictions about privatization in Eastern 
Europe were logically faulty per se or whether their implementation – the privatization process – 
crucially modified its outcomes. Two central predictions of the theory of mass privatization as a 
property reform strategy, that the state’s fiscal shock would be compensated by i) savings from 
overcoming inefficient planning and ii) additional revenues raised from the superior growth of de 
novo private firms, are not borne out in available data. As Kogut and Spicer’s (2002) qualitative 
study of mass privatization in Russia and the Czech Republic found, privatization had adverse   38
effects on governance and restructuring. Our data corroborate this finding across the region and 
further show that tax collection was more difficult among newly privatized firms. 
Privatization is likely to remain a salient issue in coming years. As three senior World Bank 
officials note in a recent volume on privatization in transition economies, “What still amazes 
many of us who worked on privatization throughout this period in the transition countries is how 
quickly the transformation happened. However, there is more to do with respect to privatization 
in many countries in the region and transition economies elsewhere in the world” (Lieberman et 
al. 2008: 59). As recently as 2008, Egypt considered implementing a mass privatization program, 
distributing public company shares to some 40 million Egyptian citizens (Saif and Choucair 
2008). Similar policies had been contemplated in Syria and Tunisia prior to the 2011 Arab 
Spring, with the EBRD being invited to consult on the process. Whenever such large-scale 
economic restructurings take place, there is potential for unintended consequences that can 
fundamentally alter the program’s implementation and outcomes. Only if we carefully measure 
the economic, political and social consequences of past reform strategies will we be able to avoid 
repeating their mistakes in the future.  REFERENCES 
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TABLE 1 
VARIABLES USED IN CROSS-NATIONAL REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable Description  Source 
Response variables    
  Government efficiency  How would you rate the efficiency of the 
government in delivering services? (q48b), 
reverse coded 
BEEPS 
  Weak contracts  To what degree do you agree with this 
statement? “I am confident that the legal 
system will uphold my contract and property 
rights in business disputes”. (q23a) 
BEEPS 
  Unofficial payments  On average, what percent of revenues do firms 
like yours typically pay per annum in 
unofficial payments to public officials? (q27) 
BEEPS 
  Real government spending  Government spending in constant 2000 
dollars, expressed as a percentage of 1992 
spending 
WDI 
  Real GDP per capita  GDP per capita in constant 2000 dollars, 
expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP per 
capita 
WDI 
Explanatory variables    
  Mass privatization  Dummy variable indicating mass privatization 
programs covering at least 25% of large 
enterprises (see Online Supplement C for 
coding) 
Authors’ coding 
  Price liberalization  EBRD index of price liberalization  EBRD 
 Democratization  Cumulative  civil liberties and political rights 
score 
Freedom House 
  Oil  Presence of oil  Authors’ coding 
  War  Military or ethnic conflict  Authors’ coding 
  Urbanization  Urban population as a percentage of total 
population 
WDI 
  Education  Tertiary education gross enrollment rate  WDI 
  Former Soviet Union  Dummy indicating whether a country was part 
of the Former Soviet Union 
Authors’ coding 
  Initial GDP per capita  Level of GDP in 1990  WDI 
Note: EBRD is the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development; WDI is the World Bank World 
Development Indicators database (2005 and 2008 editions); BEEPS is the World Bank/EBRD Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey, 1999-2000. 
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TABLE 2 
VARIABLES USED IN FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable  Description / Survey Question  Coding 
Dependent variables    
  Barter  What share of your firm’s sales are now 
conducted in barter, offsets or bills of 
exchange (money surrogates)? (q67a) 
0 = No Barter 
1 = Barter 
 Investment 
Increased 
By what percentage has your investment 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Investment 
Decreased/Stayed the 
Same 
1 = Investment 
Increased 
  Sales Increased  By what percentage have your sales 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Sales 
Decreased/Stayed the 
Same 
1 = Sales Increased 
 Employment 
Increased 
By what percentage has your employment 
increased/decreased over the past three years? 
(q50c/q50d) 
0 = Employment 
Decreased or Stayed 
the Same 
1 = Employment 
Increased 
  Overdue taxes  Is the amount of payments overdue (by more 
than 90 days) by your company to government 
taxes substantial, manageable, modest or non-
existent? (q53a) 
0 = non-existent 
1 = substantial. 
manageable, or 
modest 
 New  Product 
development 
Has your company undertaken the successful 
development of major new product line in the 
last three years? (q54) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
  Product upgrade  Has your company undertaken the successful 
upgrading of existing product line in the last 
three years? (q54) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
Explanatory variables    
  Privatized  Dummy variable indicating firm was 
established by privatization of a state-owned 
firm (q7). 
0=not privatized 
1=privatized 
  Foreign  Dummy variable indicating foreign ownership  0 = <100% foreign 
ownership 
1 = 100% foreign 
ownership   52
TABLE 2 (CONTINUED) 
VARIABLES USED IN FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS 
 
Variable  Description / Survey Question  Coding 
  Sector Dummies  Dummy for firm sector, including agriculture, 
manufacturing, mining, construction, trade, 
retail, transport, finance, power and other 
sectors. 
0/1 
  Firm age  In what year was your firm founded? (q6)  Age 
  Technology  Dummy for whether firm has internet access 
(qS.17) 
0 = No access 
1= Access 
  Size  Scale of full-time employees, ranging from 1 
(1-9) to 7 (500 or more) (qS.5) 
Number 
 Size
2  Squared scale of full-time employees, ranging 
from 1 (1-9) to 7 (500 or more) 
 
  Large  Dummy for >200 employees  0 = <200 employees 
1 = ≥200 employees 
  Firm trades with 
the state sector 
Does your company trade with the state sector  0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 Firm  receives 
subsidies 
Does your enterprise receive subsidies 
(including tolerance of tax arrears) from local 
or national government (q65a) 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 New  General 
Manager 
Dummy for whether there had been a change 
in the general manager within the last three 
years (q8). 
0 = No 
1 = Yes 
 Domestic 
monopoly 
Dummy for whether firm has 100% of market 
share (q61) 
0 = <100% market 
share 
1 = 100% market 
share 
Source: World Bank/EBRD Business Enterprise and Environment Performance Survey, 1999/2000. 
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TABLE 3 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON SUBJECTIVE MEASURES OF STATE CAPACITY 
 
 (1)  (2)  (3) 
  Govt. inefficiency  Poor Property Rights  Unofficial payments 
Mass privatization  0.19
* 
[0.035,0.34] 
0.27
** 
[0.098,0.45] 
0.073
* 
[0.010,0.14] 
Price liberalization  -0.0026 
[-0.15,0.15] 
-0.063 
[-0.31,0.18] 
0.066 
[-0.039,0.17] 
Democratization -0.016 
[-0.052,0.020] 
0.014 
[-0.048,0.077] 
0.012 
[-0.015,0.039] 
Presence of oil  0.055 
[-0.12,0.23] 
0.0051 
[-0.25,0.26] 
-0.098 
[-0.27,0.070] 
Military conflict  -0.0017 
[-0.033,0.029] 
-0.019 
[-0.058,0.020] 
0.0048 
[-0.040,0.049] 
Urbanization 0.0015 
[-0.0033,0.0063] 
0.0013 
[-0.0067,0.0093] 
-0.0029 
[-0.0076,0.0017] 
Education -0.0026 
[-0.0100,0.0047] 
0.0021 
[-0.0058,0.0099] 
-0.0035 
[-0.0087,0.0018] 
Former Soviet Union  -0.063 
[-0.27,0.15] 
-0.077 
[-0.30,0.15] 
0.099 
[-0.0062,0.20] 
Initial GDP per capita  -0.000027 
[-0.00011,0.000051] 
-0.0000065 
[-0.000092,0.000079] 
0.000013 
[-0.000027,0.000052] 
Constant 0.78 
[-0.24,1.81] 
0.43 
[-1.43,2.28] 
0.19 
[-0.53,0.92] 
Observations 23  23  23 
R
2 0.644  0.663  0.589 
Note: 95% confidence intervals in brackets 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001TABLE 4 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING PER CAPITA AND REAL GDP 
PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 (FULL SAMPLE) 
 
  Government spending    GDP per capita 
   (4)  (5)  (6)    (7)  (8)  (9) 
Mass privatization  -25.0
** 
(7.61) 
-19.9
** 
(6.93) 
-21.1
* 
(8.78) 
  -13.3
** 
(4.12) 
-14.9
*** 
(4.14) 
-16.3
***
(4.36) 
Price liberalization   
 
-13.3
*** 
(3.59) 
-7.82
* 
(3.97) 
   
 
-6.28
** 
(2.15) 
-7.56
***
(2.29) 
Democratization   
 
-2.76 
(1.89) 
-0.80 
(2.12) 
   
 
-1.29 
(0.87) 
-0.011 
(0.93) 
Oil   
 
-14.4 
(11.1) 
14.1 
(17.3) 
   
 
-1.81 
(7.15) 
-0.62 
(12.4) 
War   
 
6.68 
(12.3) 
-5.46 
(13.2) 
   
 
-6.66 
(4.14) 
-11.7 
(6.19) 
Urbanization   
 
0.18 
(0.47) 
-0.48 
(0.50) 
   
 
0.20 
(0.29) 
-0.14 
(0.39) 
Education   
 
1.62
*** 
(0.36) 
2.04
*** 
(0.42) 
   
 
1.10
*** 
(0.15) 
0.98
*** 
(0.27) 
Initial GDP per capita   
 
0.0016 
(0.0037) 
0.0021 
(0.0025) 
   
 
0.00086 
(0.0015) 
0.0036
**
(0.0013) 
Country-year trends  No No  Yes    No No Yes 
Nation-years  242  242  242    253  253  253 
Nations  24  24  24    25  25  25 
R
2  0.036  0.397  0.723    0.117  0.365  0.782 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; 
random effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real government spending per capita is expressed as a 
percentage of 1992 government spending. Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001   55
TABLE 5 
FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
 
 Barter    Investment    Sales    Employment 
  (22)  (23)   (24)  (25)  (26)  (27)  (28)  (29) 
  MP  Non-MP    MP  Non-MP   MP  Non-MP   MP  Non-MP 
Privatization 1.78
*** 
(0.26) 
1.09 
(0.18) 
 0.59
*** 
(0.071) 
0.86 
(0.10) 
 0.64
*** 
(0.070) 
0.82 
(0.13) 
 0.42
*** 
(0.051) 
0.39
*** 
(0.10) 
FDI 0.38
*** 
(0.11) 
0.83 
(0.31) 
 0.96 
(0.22) 
1.43 
(0.60) 
 1.74
* 
(0.49) 
1.03 
(0.42) 
 1.86 
(0.92) 
1.50 
(0.60) 
Agriculture 4.32
*** 
(1.06) 
0.61 
(0.18) 
 1.17 
(0.50) 
0.65 
(0.24) 
 1.99 
(0.85) 
1.04 
(0.37) 
 0.97 
(0.24) 
0.78 
(0.22) 
Manufacturing 1.85
* 
(0.48) 
0.96 
(0.26) 
 1.76 
(0.67) 
0.74 
(0.21) 
 1.89 
(0.78) 
0.87 
(0.22) 
 1.93 
(0.65) 
1.15 
(0.19) 
Mining 1.67 
(0.85) 
1.54 
(1.37) 
 0.93 
(0.88) 
0.23 
(0.24) 
 0.95 
(0.54) 
0.087 
(0.11) 
 1.22 
(0.91) 
— 
 
Construction 3.24
*** 
(1.00) 
0.90 
(0.19) 
 1.17 
(0.58) 
0.66 
(0.23) 
 1.49 
(0.63) 
0.83 
(0.33) 
 1.79
** 
(0.39) 
1.09 
(0.29) 
Trade 1.91
* 
(0.48) 
0.75 
(0.28) 
 1.70 
(0.51) 
0.83 
(0.26) 
 2.16
* 
(0.67) 
1.25 
(0.41) 
 1.92
* 
(0.54) 
1.48 
(0.47) 
Retail 0.86 
(0.20) 
0.57
* 
(0.15) 
 2.01 
(0.81) 
0.51 
(0.18) 
 1.83 
(0.72) 
0.71 
(0.22) 
 1.86 
(0.60) 
1.00 
(0.20) 
Finance 0.26 
(0.22) 
0.16
*** 
(0.072) 
 1.93 
(0.67) 
0.60 
(0.33) 
 1.88 
(1.33) 
1.20 
(0.88) 
 2.61
** 
(0.88) 
2.88
** 
(1.02) 
Power/Energy 1.01 
(0.65) 
0.28 
(0.29) 
 0.52 
(0.73) 
0.70 
(0.64) 
 0.77 
(0.74) 
0.59 
(0.55) 
 0.61 
(0.79) 
1.21 
(0.78) 
Other sector  0.96 
(0.36) 
0.63 
(0.24) 
 1.58 
(0.70) 
0.71 
(0.25) 
 1.81 
(0.65) 
0.97 
(0.34) 
 1.69 
(0.62) 
1.49 
(0.40) 
Firm age  1.00 
(0.004
4) 
1.02
* 
(0.0071) 
 0.99 
(0.0054) 
1.00 
(0.0027) 
 0.99 
(0.0030) 
0.99
** 
(0.0031) 
 0.99
* 
(0.0047) 
0.99
* 
(0.0040) 
Technology 0.89 
(0.094) 
1.71
* 
(0.46) 
 2.26
*** 
(0.49) 
2.07
*** 
(0.41) 
 2.43
*** 
(0.44) 
1.90
*** 
(0.36) 
 2.34
*** 
(0.29) 
2.27
*** 
(0.43) 
Size 2.58
* 
(1.03) 
1.46 
(0.40) 
 1.10 
(0.23) 
1.27 
(0.34) 
 1.13 
(0.32) 
1.32 
(0.34) 
 2.21
* 
(0.73) 
2.08 
(0.80) 
Size
2 0.92 
(0.041) 
0.97 
(0.033) 
 1.00 
(0.027) 
0.97 
(0.028) 
 1.00 
(0.035) 
0.98 
(0.030) 
 0.92 
(0.037) 
0.90
* 
(0.045) 
Large 0.93 
(0.25) 
0.90 
(0.32) 
 0.91 
(0.20) 
1.20 
(0.30) 
 0.87 
(0.19) 
1.15 
(0.29) 
 0.96 
(0.25) 
1.44 
(0.41) 
Firm subsidy  1.61
* 
(0.37) 
0.91 
(0.26) 
 1.36 
(0.29) 
0.97 
(0.17) 
 1.22 
(0.18) 
0.91 
(0.15) 
 0.93 
(0.18) 
0.84 
(0.14) 
State trade  2.53
*** 
(0.34) 
2.34
*** 
(0.31) 
 1.10 
(0.23) 
1.19 
(0.18) 
 1.34
** 
(0.15) 
1.22 
(0.23) 
 1.30
* 
(0.16) 
1.31 
(0.26) 
New GM  1.68
* 
(0.34) 
1.19 
(0.18) 
 0.86 
(0.11) 
0.90 
(0.20) 
 0.98 
(0.14) 
0.92 
(0.12) 
 0.93 
(0.096) 
0.93 
(0.16) 
Dom. 
monopoly 
0.80 
(0.20) 
0.74 
(0.13) 
 0.69 
(0.19) 
0.93 
(0.21) 
 0.70 
(0.17) 
0.89 
(0.18) 
 0.85 
(0.17) 
0.93 
(0.16) 
Observations  1823  1684   1834  1664  1836  1680  1836  1653 
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001   56
TABLE 5 (CONTINUED) 
FIRM-LEVEL LOGISTIC REGRESSIONS RESULTS 
  Overdue taxes    Prod. development    Prod. upgrade 
 (30)  (31)    (32)  (33)    (34)  (35) 
 MP  Non-MP    MP  Non-MP    MP  Non-MP 
Privatization 1.56
** 
(0.22) 
1.39
** 
(0.17) 
 0.64
** 
(0.087) 
0.93 
(0.20) 
 0.74
* 
(0.100) 
0.86 
(0.11) 
FDI 0.47
* 
(0.15) 
1.70 
(0.61) 
 1.14 
(0.32) 
1.42 
(0.49) 
 1.16 
(0.31) 
0.87 
(0.31) 
Agriculture 3.13
** 
(1.17) 
0.91 
(0.28) 
 2.44 
(1.16) 
2.28
* 
(0.88) 
 0.93 
(0.29) 
0.71 
(0.26) 
Manufacturing 1.41 
(0.31) 
1.29 
(0.44) 
 4.75
*** 
(1.78) 
2.49
** 
(0.74) 
 4.07
*** 
(1.12) 
2.35
*** 
(0.57) 
Mining 2.93 
(3.08) 
3.18 
(2.87) 
 2.42 
(1.74) 
0.95 
(0.90) 
 1.67 
(0.87) 
0.41 
(0.39) 
Construction 1.43 
(0.37) 
1.67 
(0.54) 
 1.80 
(0.85) 
1.07 
(0.41) 
 1.24 
(0.36) 
0.98 
(0.29) 
Trade 1.27 
(0.29) 
1.32 
(0.33) 
 3.04
* 
(1.45) 
1.37 
(0.36) 
 1.21 
(0.38) 
0.80 
(0.21) 
Retail 1.60 
(0.50) 
0.67 
(0.22) 
 2.01 
(0.84) 
1.14 
(0.28) 
 1.33 
(0.43) 
1.12 
(0.28) 
Finance 0.40 
(0.43) 
0.93 
(0.34) 
 2.14 
(0.95) 
1.94 
(1.00) 
 2.06 
(0.88) 
1.15 
(0.66) 
Power/Energy 1.27 
(1.16) 
1.41 
(1.58) 
 1.74 
(0.82) 
3.10 
(2.23) 
 2.16 
(1.39) 
1.97 
(2.37) 
Other sector  0.86 
(0.19) 
1.17 
(0.49) 
 1.96 
(0.92) 
1.46 
(0.30) 
 1.31 
(0.38) 
1.21 
(0.20) 
Firm age  1.00 
(0.0039) 
1.01
* 
(0.0039) 
 0.99
* 
(0.0043) 
1.00 
(0.0037) 
 1.00 
(0.0027) 
1.00 
(0.0036) 
Technology 0.82 
(0.086) 
0.70 
(0.18) 
 1.68
*** 
(0.26) 
1.57
* 
(0.31) 
 2.11
*** 
(0.32) 
1.86
*** 
(0.30) 
Size 1.00 
(0.33) 
1.81
* 
(0.46) 
 1.03 
(0.29) 
0.90 
(0.17) 
 1.51 
(0.45) 
0.76 
(0.27) 
Size
2 1.05 
(0.052) 
0.92
* 
(0.031) 
 1.01 
(0.037) 
1.03 
(0.026) 
 0.96 
(0.038) 
1.06 
(0.042) 
Large 0.43 
(0.22) 
1.45 
(0.47) 
 1.01 
(0.31) 
0.73 
(0.23) 
 1.50 
(0.54) 
0.52
*** 
(0.095) 
Firm subsidy  1.17 
(0.35) 
1.85
** 
(0.36) 
 1.21 
(0.35) 
1.04 
(0.25) 
 1.36 
(0.44) 
0.86 
(0.14) 
State trade  1.33
* 
(0.18) 
0.86 
(0.17) 
 1.28 
(0.17) 
1.33 
(0.23) 
 1.04 
(0.14) 
1.27 
(0.25) 
New GM  1.45 
(0.41) 
1.38
* 
(0.22) 
 1.23 
(0.16) 
0.77 
(0.13) 
 0.77 
(0.15) 
0.87 
(0.083) 
Dom. monopoly  1.08 
(0.19) 
1.30 
(0.36) 
 0.58
** 
(0.098) 
0.94 
(0.18) 
 0.68 
(0.17) 
0.73 
(0.13) 
Observations 1804  1672    1839  1711    1839  1711 
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001  
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENT B: METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION 
 
There were eight different ways in which this privatization was actually accomplished. All 
countries employed a combination of these methods. 
  
(1) VOUCHERS OR COUPONS. These were programs that offered adult citizens “vouchers” or 
“coupons”, which could then be used to purchase enterprises during privatization 
auctions. Their face value was much greater than their cost to the public. This was the 
dominant method of privatization in Russia and constitutes the subject of this empirical 
analysis. 
(2) COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS. These typically occurred after a period of active restructuring. 
Some form of foreign ownership was often a natural outcome of this method (since they 
would be expected to win a large percentage of fair auctions because of their capital and 
experience). This was the modal form employed in Hungary and Poland (see King and 
Sznajder 2006).  
(3) NON-COMPETITIVE AUCTIONS. In many instances, politically connected businessmen were 
able to privatize enterprises via rigged auctions. In such cases, the price paid for the 
enterprise was incredibly low. This was the modal form of Russia’s raw materials sector 
in the now infamous “Loans for Shares” program in which the crown-jewels of the 
Russian economy, its oil and metals firms, were privatized by oligarchs in exchange for 
media and political support for Boris Yeltsin’s 1996 re-election bid (see King and 
Treskow 2006 for details). 
(4) MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYEE BUYOUTS (MEBO). Perhaps the most common form of 
privatization, management and employee buyouts were accomplished in a variety of 
ways, but almost always involved substantial discounts to enterprise insiders. In most 
cases, management or some outside owners would centralize the shares of the workers by 
slowly buying them up. Sometimes they would use lease-to-own arrangements, in which 
managers and employees would lease the enterprise from the state until they paid an 
amount that made them its owners.  
(5) EMPLOYEE-SHARE OWNERSHIP PROGRAMS (ESOP). These are employee shared 
ownership schemes in which the employees gain ownership of the firm. Unlike ordinary 
management and employee buyouts, however, there is a legal devise that centralizes the 
ownership and voting of the workers. This is crucial, since it guarantees actual worker 
control. These were very rare throughout the post-communist world, and were largely 
prohibited in Russia.  
(6) FOREIGN INVESTMENT. Foreign investment can take the form of portfolio purchases, 
whereby a company is listed on a foreign stock exchange as an initial public offering 
(IPO). Most foreign investment in post-socialist countries took the form of direct 
investment (FDI), where a foreign firm purchased and controlled a company. It was 
typically the outcome of “fair” auctions, but was also accomplished in other ways. There 
could be a formal or informal preference for FDI (such as in Estonia, where FDI was 
sought as a hedge against Russian domination). In some cases, FDI operated via closed 
tenders, where the process is non-transparent and negotiated directly between the 
government and foreign buyers. FDI was the dominant privatization method in Hungary   59
and CEE more generally. FDI can also take the form of joint ventures with state owned 
enterprises (as is common in China).  
(7) CROSS-OWNERSHIP. Here, firms are allowed to purchase the shares of other firms, which 
in turn purchase the shares of their new owners. The result is a system of cross-
institutional ownership where a group of firms own themselves. This in practice means 
the upper management of these firms controls them through outside owners. This was 
observed in the Czech Republic (King 2001a, 2001b). 
(8) RESTITUTION. In some cases the legal title of some enterprises that had been nationalized 
by the Communist regime was returned to their original family of ownership. Another 
variant was to give vouchers to compensate for nationalized property that could be used 
to purchase other stocks. Overall, restitution vouchers accounted only for a small 
percentage of state assets included in privatization (King 2007). 
(9) GREENFIELD PRIVATIZATION. This strategy consists of delaying privatization while 
creating the conditions for greenfield investment and preparing the exit of inefficient 
firms. In essence, it allows a private economy to emerge in the presence of an 
increasingly marketized state sector, until the country “grows out of the plan”. This is the 
dominant method in China.  
    
    60
 
ONLINE SUPPLEMENT C: BEST ESTIMATE OF EXTENT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM 
 
Country    Mass privatization scheme  Coding 
Albania   Never implemented  No 
Armenia  75% medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Azerbaijan  Less than 10% of firms by assets   No 
Belarus Never  implemented  No 
Bulgaria  Never implemented   No 
Croatia  Very small program (225,000 people) in residual state 
holdings in 15% of enterprises 
No 
Czech Republic  33% of assets of all firms  Yes 
Estonia Never  implemented  No 
Georgia  50% of medium and large enterprises  Yes 
Hungary Never  implemented  No 
Kazakhstan  60% of large enterprises   Yes 
Kyrgyz Rep  50% of medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Latvia  About 40% of large or medium enterprises   Yes 
Lithuania  About 45% of all enterprise assets  Yes 
Macedonia  Never implemented   No 
Moldova  40-50% of assets  Yes 
Poland  About 10% of assets  No 
Romania  About 38% of medium and large enterprises  Yes 
Russia  More than 80% of the industrial workforce  Yes 
Slovakia  About 10-15% (all while part of Czechoslovakia)   No 
Slovenia Never  implemented  No 
Tajikistan Never  implemented  No 
Turkmenistan Never  implemented  No 
Ukraine  About 44% of medium and large enterprises   Yes 
Uzbekistan Never  implemented  No 
Source: Country descriptions, all years of Transition Report (EBRD 1994-2005). 
Note: Mass privatization = privatization by vouchers alone or in combination with management and 
employee buyouts (see Online Supplement B for descriptions).  
 ONLINE SUPPLEMENT D. CROSS-NATIONAL AND FIRM-LEVEL MODELS AND METHODS 
 
Cross-National 
We first tested the effects of mass privatization on a series of state capacity indicators at the 
country level using cross-sectional survey data. Our basic model is as follows: 
STATECAP i = α + β1PRIVi + β2LIBi + β3DEM i + β4OILi + β5WAR i + β6URBANi + 
β7HIGHEDi + β8FSUi + β9INITGDPi + εi 
STATECAP refers to our subjective state capacity indicators; PRIV is our measure of 
privatization; LIB is the EBRD index of price liberalization; DEM is the Freedom House index 
of democratization; OIL is the dummy for the presence of oil; URBAN is the rate of 
urbanization; HIGHED is the tertiary education enrollment rate; WAR is a dummy for the 
occurrence of military or ethnic conflict; INITGDP is the level of GDP at the start of transition; 
and ε is the error term.  
Our basic models for the time-series analysis are as follows: 
(1) GOVSPEND1990 i,t = α + β1PRIVi,t + β2LIBi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4OILi,t + β5WARi,t + β6URBANi,t 
+ β7HIGHEDi,t + β8INITGDPi,t + εi,t 
(2) GDP1990i,t = α + β1PRIVi,t + β2LIBi,t + β3DEMi,t + β4OILi,t + β5WARi,t + β6URBANi,t + 
β7HIGHEDi,t + β8INITGDPi,t + εi,t 
Here, i refers to country and t refers to year. GDP1990 [GOVSPEND1990] is the current year’s 
GDP in constant 2000 US dollars [government spending in constant 2000 dollars], expressed as a 
percentage of the 1990 level of GDP per capita [the 1992 level of government spending]; PRIV 
is our measure of privatization; LIB is the EBRD index of price liberalization; DEM is the 
Freedom House index of democratization; OIL is the dummy for the present of oil; URBAN is 
the rate of urbanization; HIGHED is the tertiary education enrollment rate; WAR is a dummy for   62
the occurrence of military or ethnic conflict; INITGDP is the level of GDP at the start of 
transition; and ε is the error term. Models were estimated using random effects, as Hausman-
Taylor tests indicated that unobserved country-fixed effects added no significant explanatory 
power (or affected coefficient estimates) after taking the main factors of the model into account. 
Our approach uses a weighted average of variation within countries (assessing outcomes before 
and after the effects of mass privatization), and between countries (evaluating longer-term 
divergences between post-communist countries during the transition). Standard errors were 
clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling, and to make statistical inferences 
unbiased to serial correlation in the data. 
 
Firm-Level 
We employ the following basic model: 
Firm Performance i = α + β1PRIVi + β2FDI i + β3-20 [controls] i + εi 
PRIV is a dummy variable indicating if the firm ws established by privatization of a state-owned 
firm. FDI is a dummy variable indicating full foreign ownership. Models are also adjusted for 
two broad sets of controls: sector dummies (including agriculture, manufacturing, mining, 
construction, trade, retail, transport, finance, power, and other sectors), and firm and market 
characteristics (including firm age, access to technology, firm size, state trade, and presence of a 
domestic monopoly). Table 2 further describes the explanatory and response variables used in 
our model.ONLINE SUPPLEMENT E 
 
TABLE E1 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GOVERNMENT SPENDING PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 (SPLIT 
SAMPLE) 
 
 FSU    non-FSU 
    (10)  (11) (12)    (13)  (14) (15) 
Mass privatization  -27.0
** 
(8.98) 
-19.8
*** 
(5.00) 
-22.8
** 
(7.59) 
  -14.4
*
(5.79) 
-0.58 
(17.5) 
4.09 
(21.7) 
Price liberalization  - 
 
-11.1
** 
(3.91) 
-3.07 
(5.25) 
 - 
 
-9.63
** 
(2.97) 
-6.38 
(3.96) 
Democratization - 
 
6.95
*** 
(1.68) 
4.82
** 
(1.83) 
 - 
 
-4.51 
(3.93) 
-4.31 
(4.99) 
Oil - 
 
1.90 
(13.9) 
126.9
***
(30.4) 
 - 
 
n/a n/a
 
War - 
 
31.2
*** 
(8.09) 
4.83 
(13.1) 
 - 
 
-29.8 
(20.3) 
-24.7 
(20.6) 
Urbanization - 
 
-0.074 
(0.83) 
11.6
** 
(4.37) 
 - 
 
-0.65 
(0.53) 
3.30 
(4.37) 
Education - 
 
1.70
*** 
(0.44) 
1.91
** 
(0.65) 
 - 
 
1.13
* 
(0.45) 
1.12 
(1.17) 
Initial GDP per capita  - 
 
0.0010 
(0.0086) 
-0.53
** 
(0.18) 
 - 
 
0.0061 
(0.0041) 
-1.30 
(1.59) 
Country-year  trends  No  No Yes    No  No Yes 
Nation-years 147  147  147    95  95  95 
Nations 15  15  15    9  9  9 
R
2  0.004  0.472 0.779    0.047  0.369 0.607 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; 
random effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real government spending per capita is expressed as a 
percentage of 1992 government spending. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001TABLE E2 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GDP PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 (SPLIT SAMPLE) 
 
   FSU    non-FSU   
   (16)  (17)  (18)    (19)  (20)  (21) 
Mass privatization  -15.7
*** 
(4.13) 
-11.4
** 
(3.99) 
-13.1
** 
(4.56) 
 1.63 
(0.89) 
-0.24 
(3.84) 
2.36 
(6.22) 
Price liberalization  - 
 
-10.2
*** 
(1.33) 
-8.49
***
(2.33) 
 - 
 
3.17 
(3.74) 
2.01 
(1.84) 
Democratization - 
 
-1.12 
(0.93) 
-0.16 
(0.90) 
 - 
 
2.80 
(1.98) 
3.25 
(1.76) 
Oil - 
 
5.48 
(6.86) 
45.5
* 
(22.1) 
 - 
 
n/a n/a 
War - 
 
-8.46 
(5.54) 
-20.2
** 
(6.69) 
 - 
 
-2.38 
(5.94) 
1.00 
(5.38) 
Urbanization -  0.18 
(0.35) 
5.45
* 
(2.78) 
 - 
 
0.31 
(0.37) 
3.58 
(2.89) 
Education -  1.11
*** 
(0.17) 
1.15
*** 
(0.34) 
 - 
 
1.03
*** 
(0.30) 
1.24
** 
(0.48) 
Initial GDP per capita  - 
 
-0.0034 
(0.0034) 
-0.25
* 
(0.11) 
 - 
 
0.00025 
(0.0018) 
-0.067 
(0.68) 
Country-year trends  No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
Nation-years 150  150  150    103  103  103 
Nations 15  15  15    10  10  10 
R
2  0.081  0.426  0.735    <0.001  0.189  0.777 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; random 
effects models presented, controls for country-specific fixed effects do not change the coefficient on mass 
privatization (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 1.18, p=0.28). Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 
GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 ONLINE SUPPLEMENT F: REPLICATION USING EBRD AVERAGE PRIVATIZATION INDEX 
 
As a robustness check to our basic findings, we also evaluated the effects of the EBRD’s 
subjective indices on progress in privatization drawn from the EBRD Transition Indicator 
database. These EBRD indicators range from 1 (planned) to 4.3 (advanced market). Because 
their small- and large-scale indices are so highly correlated (r >0.97 in most countries) as to be 
statistically indistinguishable, following Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) we used an average of these 
indices to reduce measurement errors. 
 
TABLE F1 
EFFECT OF MASS PRIVATIZATION ON REAL GDP PER CAPITA, 1990-2000 
 
   FSU   non-FSU 
   (1)  (2)  (3)    (4)  (5)  (6) 
EBRD average privatization 
index 
-7.91
** 
(2.33) 
-4.88 
(2.50) 
-6.82
* 
(2.48) 
 4.89 
(2.52) 
-3.91 
(2.78) 
-5.14 
(3.34) 
Price liberalization  - 
 
-9.39
*** 
(1.52) 
-11.0
***
(2.01) 
 - 
 
1.41 
(1.62) 
-0.46 
(1.57) 
Democratization - 
 
1.68 
(1.21) 
2.51
* 
(1.07) 
 - 
 
2.67 
(1.37) 
3.08 
(1.83) 
War - 
 
-5.90 
(8.03) 
4.70 
(7.51) 
 - 
 
1.39 
(2.58) 
-5.02 
(2.22) 
Urbanization - 
 
-0.24 
(1.86) 
-0.12 
(2.25) 
 - 
 
4.21 
(1.96) 
-0.14 
(5.57) 
Education - 
 
1.11
*** 
(0.19) 
1.11
** 
(0.30) 
 - 
 
1.30
** 
(0.28) 
0.36 
(0.59) 
Country-year trends  No  No  Yes    No  No  Yes 
Nation-years 150  150  150    103  103  103 
Nations 15  15  15    10  10  10 
R
2-within 0.254  0.582  0.751    0.130  0.611  0.805 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by country to reflect non-independence of sampling; fixed 
effects models presented, as unobserved country fixed effects cannot be assumed to be exogenous to the mass 
privatization-growth relationship (Hausman-Taylor χ
2(1) = 46.89, p<0.0001). These fixed effects correct for the 
effects of oil and initial GDP. Real GDP per capita is expressed as a percentage of 1990 GDP. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001 
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ONLINE SUPPLEMENT G: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MASS PRIVATIZATION 
 
The following studies of the ten post-socialist countries which implemented mass privatization 
programs consistently suggest that privatization policy was driven by political motives of various 
kinds (including ethnic, fiscal, anti-Russian, and interest group politics). A separate, detailed 
discussion of the Russian case is provided below; for illustrative purposes, we also include a 
short overview of China’s alternative path to property reform. 
 
Armenia: Arakelyan (2005: 195-288); Roth-Alecandro (1997) 
Czech Republic: Schwartz (2006: 85-156); Desai and Plockovà (1997) 
Georgia: Bell (1997); Silagadze and Beridze (1996: 354-356) 
Kazakhstan: Olcott 2010: (136-143); Haghayeghi (1997: 321-328); Lorch and Karlova 
(1997) 
Kyrgyzstan: Abazov (1999: 207-210); Fine (1997); Jermakowicz and Pańków (1995) 
Latvia: Mygind (1999) 
Lithuania: Morkunaite (1999); Lee (1997); Samonis (1995) 
Moldova: Gutsu (1996); Stolojan (1997) 
Romania: Shen (1997: 121-138); Earle and Telegdy (1998); Tardy (1997) 
Ukraine: Åslund (2009: 78-83); Drum (1997) 
 
Privatization in the Russian Federation 
 
Privatization in Russia was the political project of an alliance of domestic elites and foreign 
policy advisors. In July 1991, the government issued preliminary privatization laws, and then 
charged the State Committee for Management of State Property (GKI) under the chairmanship of 
Anatoli Chubais with developing a national privatization strategy (Shleifer and Treisman 2001: 
22-23). The GKI was advised by a team of Western economists and received considerable 
financial support from international donors such as USAID (Cohen 2001; Wedel 2001). The 
voucher privatization program developed by the GKI and advanced by the Yeltsin government 
encountered significant political resistance, however; the debate initially focused on whether 
privatization should proceed at all, and subsequently on the form the privatization program 
would take (Barnes 2006: 70-75). 
The mass privatization program ultimately adopted by the Russian parliament was the 
outcome of a political compromise, in which the reformers allied themselves with the firm 
managers, while simultaneously mobilizing popular support for the voucher program (Barnes 
2006: 74-75). Mass privatization was thus a purposeful project of the Russian authorities. This 
point is further supported by Reddaway and Glinski (2001) who highlight that “counterfactual 
opportunities” (5) remained available in the form of alternative privatization models proposed by 
the domestic political opposition. In the fall of 1992, the Yeltsin government’s future course of 
action was contingent on its “choice of allies in society at large and coalition partners” (13), and 
it opted for the “commercialized nomenklatura” and its “sympathizers in the West” (13).  
The economic objective of mass privatization was neither the practical implementation of 
neoliberal ideology (i.e. the creation of private owners who rationally maximize their self-
interest), nor a mere populist measure to produce a “millions of owners rather than a handful of 
millionaires” by distributing company shares to all citizens. Rather, in the words of Anatoli 
Chubais: 
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A number of people would be unsatisfied with the outcome, but the fundamental problem was, will 
[privatization] happen or not? From an economic point of view, voucher privatization – the voucher 
itself was not the best way to achieve privatization. More to the point, it was clear that the voucher 
was a substitute for money, and if you issue a voucher, you will not get money from privatization by 
selling state properties, but that was the price. It was the only way to make it doable. ... No one said 
that the goal of voucher privatization was to restructure private property, to restructure companies, 
to attract investments, to speed up economic growth, or to increase the standard of living because it 
was clear that the process would require several stages. Voucher privatization was just asset 
distribution, leading to the next stage of property concentration, resulting in new investments, finally 
leading to enterprise restructuring. There are at least four or five stages (quoted in Desai [2006: 89]; 
our emphasis). 
 
The central political objective of mass privatization was to make the reform process and the 
distribution of assets to private owners irreversible, and thereby quell ongoing resistance from 
anti-reform political factions, especially in the Congress of People’s Deputies, which was 
dominated by the communists in late 1992 when mass privatization was launched (Barnes 2006; 
Desai 2006; Lieberman, Nestor, and Desai 1997; Boycko, Shleifer and Vishny 1995). Chubais, 
the main architect of the program, confirmed this assessment in an interview in 1999: 
 
INTERVIEWER: You emerged as a reformer explicitly in 1992 with your privatization program, 
voucher privatization in particular, and I believe that this move was motivated by ideological 
considerations. You wanted Russian industry removed from state ownership and control, converting 
industrial units into joint stock companies with diversified ownership. Would you agree with that view? 
 
CHUBAIS: Absolutely. 
(Desai 2006: 88) 
 
Privatization in the People’s Republic of China 
 
China, as Naughton (1994) points out, represents the unusual case of an economy “that has 
made a transition to a primarily market economy, but in which publicly owned enterprises still 
produce the bulk of manufacturing output” (266). Indeed, by 1995, the state-owned sector 
(excluding collectively-owned firms) still accounted for 34% of China’s gross industrial output, 
down from 78% in 1978 (NBS 1996, Table 12-3). During the same period, the contribution of de 
novo private firms and of rural collective enterprises grew from virtually zero to nearly 50%. 
Plans for a systematic privatization of the state enterprises were first considered in 1994, 
when a reform and restructuring program under the slogan of “grasping the large and letting go 
the small” (zhuada fangxiao) was announced by the Chinese government (Cao, Qian, and 
Weingast 1999). By 1996, most small state and collective enterprises had been given up by 
contracting them out, by leasing or selling them, and, increasingly, by letting them go bankrupt 
(CASS 1996: 18-19). Privatization of large firms proceeded at a more gradual pace, as reformers 
emphasized the construction of globally competitive firms over the privatization of individual 
plants (or even segments thereof). Instead of outright divestment, the Chinese government 
pursued a strategy of ownership diversification by restructuring state enterprises as joint-stock 
companies with a corporate shareholding structure. During this process, only a tiny fraction of 
large state firms were actually transferred into the hands of private individuals, while the bulk of 
large firm ownership has gradually spread among a variety of public institutions (Nolan and   68
Wang 1999, 190-191). By now, some state enterprises have even carried out limited initial public 
offerings on domestic and global stock exchanges.  
Necessitated by the restructuring of the state-owned sector and the growth of the private 
sector economy, a variety of new ownership categories were introduced to the Chinese statistical 
reporting system in 1998 (shareholding enterprises, joint-stock corporations, private businesses, 
etc.). Many enterprises that had been previously labeled state-owned were re-classified under the 
new system, thus impeding the comparability of subsequent statistics. The OECD estimated on 
the basis of government statistics that the total state sector share in the economy (including firms 
owned through state-holding companies and other forms of indirect ownership) was 29.7% in 
2006 (OECD 2009: 6). Thus, even today, China differs significantly from the successor 
economies of the FSU, where state ownership typically occurs only in sectors that represent 
national security interests (e.g. energy, defense). 
 ONLINE SUPPLEMENT H: POLITICAL ECONOMY OF MASS PRIVATIZATION (TESTING INITIAL 
CONDITIONS, ETHNIC POLITICKING, EXTERNAL INFLUENCES, AND SOCIAL STRUCTURAL CHANGES) 
 
TABLE H1 
INITIAL CONDITIONS AND MASS PRIVATIZATION 
 
   Mass privatization 
Transparency 0.28
* 
(0.12) 
Rule of law  -0.045 
(0.058) 
Quality of bureaucracy  -0.23 
(0.19) 
Civil society  0.019 
(0.096) 
Defense spending  0.054 
(0.037) 
Industrial distortion  -0.026 
(0.028) 
Trade distortion  -0.0097 
(0.016) 
Black market  0.0076 
(0.0087) 
Years of central planning  -0.037 
(0.028) 
Oil 0.26 
(0.49) 
FSU 0.57 
(1.00) 
Constant - 
Observations 22 
Note: The first four institutional indices measure transparency of policymaking and 
accountability of the executive, quality of law enforcement, quality of the local bureaucracy, 
civil liberties, political rights and the influence of civic organizations based on Campos and 
Nugent (1999). See Godoy and Stiglitz (2006) for additional details. Black market exchange 
measures the difference between black market exchange rates and official exchange rates in 
1990. Defense spending is defense expenditure as a percentage of GDP in the late 1980s. 
Industrial distortion is the sum of distortions in agriculture, industry and services sectors. 
Distortion was measured as the deviation from the share of GDP in these sectors versus the 
average share for market economies with comparable GDP per capita in purchasing-power-
parity. Trade distortion is the distortion from expected trade/GDP in market economies minus 
the sum of external trade/GDP, external trade within FSU as a share of GDP and external 
trade with socialist countries as a share of GDP. Both trade and industry distortion measures 
were calculated by Popov (2000) for 1990. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 TABLE H2 
DETERMINANTS OF MASS PRIVATIZATION 
 
 Probability  of 
implementing mass 
privatization 
EBRD price liberalization 
index 
3.11
*** 
(0.61) 
Democratization index  1.40
*** 
(0.096) 
Presence of oil  2.31
* 
(0.79) 
Military conflict  0.29 
(0.22) 
Urbanization 1.04
*** 
(0.013) 
Tertiary education rates  0.92
*** 
(0.018) 
Member of the Former 
Soviet Union 
4.75
*** 
(1.47) 
Ethno-linguistic 
fractionalization 
21.9
*** 
(17.1) 
Lag of IMF Credit (log)  1.04
** 
(0.015) 
Initial GDP per capita  1.00 
(0.00011) 
Nation-years 253 
Pseudo-R
2 0.48 
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses; 
data on ethno-linguistic fractionalization from Alesina and 
Spolaore (2003), and Alesina and La Ferrara (2005). 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001   71
ONLINE SUPPLEMENT I: COUNTRY-LEVEL ENDOGENEITY 
 
TABLE I1 
ENDOGENEITY-ADJUSTED CROSS-NATIONAL ESTIMATES 
 
 GDP    Government 
spending 
Mass privatization  -42.7
*** 
(4.21) 
-12.3 
(9.63) 
Hazard of mass 
privatization 
20.2
*** 
(2.69) 
-1.97 
(5.43) 
Nation-years 253  242 
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses based on 50 replications. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
  ONLINE SUPPLEMENT J: FIRM-LEVEL ENDOGENEITY  
 
TABLE J1 
REPLICATION OF TABLE 5 (ADJUSTED FOR ENDOGENOUS FIRM SELECTION) 
 
 Barter  Investment  Sales  Employment 
 MP  Non-MP  MP  Non-MP  MP  Non-MP  MP  Non-MP 
Privatization 2.41
*** 
(0.45) 
1.21 
(0.27) 
0.73 
(0.13)
0.58
** 
(0.10) 
0.84 
(0.16)
1.09 
(0.26) 
0.58
** 
(0.10) 
0.76 
(0.17) 
 
Hazard of 
privatization 
0.64
*** 
(0.068) 
0.91 
(0.11) 
1.14 
(0.12)
1.26
* 
(0.13) 
1.05 
(0.11)
0.93 
(0.13) 
1.26
* 
(0.13) 
1.07 
(0.14) 
 
Observations  1823  1684 1834 1836 1836  1680  1836 1661 
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses. Treatment effects models estimated using a two-
step modelling framework:   
(1) Firm Performance i = α + β1PRIVi + β2FDI i + β3-20 [controls] i + β21σi + εi 
(2) Firm Privatizationo = Ф( α + β1PRIVi + β2FDI i + β3-20 [controls] i + εi) 
Here the σ is the inverse-mills ratio, the hazard of privatization, constructed from the first-stage probit model. 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
 
TABLE J1 (CONTINUED) 
 
  Overdue Taxes  Product Upgrade Product  Development 
  MP Non-MP MP Non-MP MP  Non-MP 
Privatization 1.07 
(0.19) 
1.08 
(0.22) 
0.71
*
(0.13)
1.08 
(0.24) 
0.77 
(0.13) 
1.06 
(0.22) 
Hazard of privatization  1.02 
(0.11) 
0.99 
(0.12) 
1.19 
(0.12)
0.94 
(0.12) 
1.11 
(0.11) 
0.96 
(0.12) 
Observations  1804 1672 1839 1711  1839  1711 
Note: Exponentiated coefficients; standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, 
** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001 
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ENDNOTES 
                                                 
1 Using a network analysis of citation patterns, Kogut and Spicer (2005) demonstrate how a 
small subset of contributions to the debate over transition policies, primarily by Harvard 
economists and staff members at the World Bank and IMF, served to shape and legitimate the 
neoliberal policy package.  
 
2 As two of the principal advisors described the program’s differences from prior (Western) 
instances of privatization: “We are advocating the rapid conversion of state enterprises into 
corporate form and the distribution of tranches of shares to various groups in the population, 
including workers, commercial banks, pension funds, and mutual funds. This strategy differs 
substantially from the standard methods of privatisation that have been used in the West: the sale 
of shares in an initial public offering and private placements to investor groups. The free 
distribution of shares helps to sidestep the difficult, costly, and time-consuming process of 
enterprise valuation, as well as the scarcity of financial capital in private hands in Eastern 
Europe. More importantly, corporatization combined with the free distribution of shares can 
occur quickly. Rapid privatisation is needed to combat the inevitable social, political, and 
economic problems associated with the lack of corporate governance” (Lipton and Sachs 1990b: 
333). 
 
3 McDermott (2002) is part of a small group of scholars who criticized mass privatization for its 
potential to obstruct governance. Ellerman (1998; 2003) was the first to provide a theoretical 
argument for expecting a governance disaster following mass privatization due to inevitable 
principal-agent problems. Spicer, McDermott, and Kogut (2000) reported supporting evidence 
from several sectoral case studies in Hungary, Czech Republic and Slovakia, while Kogut and 
Spicer (2002) provided extensive elite interview data from the Czech Republic and Russia, 
showing that mass privatization created governance patterns that inhibited investment due to 
uncertainty over asset ownership. King showed further case study evidence for the Czech 
Republic (2001b) and Russia (2003), linking firm failure to the diffused ownership structures 
resulting from mass privatization. Our own theory can be seen as an extension of this body of 
work, offering systematic quantitative support for the basic proposition, and extending the theory 
to emphasize the fiscal effects of mass privatization. 
 
4 For a country to be coded as having implemented a mass privatization program, the government 
had to have formally declared such a program. In some countries, there were announcements but 
the actual program was never implemented, or not implemented among large enterprises (e.g. in 
the case of Polish mass privatization [see King and Sznajder 2006]). In practice, all mass 
privatization programs that were implemented combined vouchers with different management 
and employee ownership programs (see King 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2003; Hanley, King, and Toth 
2002; King and Sznajder 2006).  
     
5 In fact, existing scholarship indicates that state capacity was generally much higher prior to the 
transition to capitalism. As Ganev (2007) points out, “a consensus has coalesced around the 
viewpoint that the transformative processes ... precipitated a rapid and radical weakening of state 
structures” (1). Popov (2004) summarizes the available statistical evidence for Russia, 
demonstrating that state capacity collapsed during the transition. While there had been some   78
                                                                                                                                                             
variation in state capacity during the late socialist period, we do not believe that it can account 
for the sharp divergence in subsequent performance. To the extent that variation existed, we 
expect to capture it in our statistical analysis controlling for initial GDP and level of education. 
 
6 For country-specific evidence suggesting that firm selection for mass privatization was largely 
sector-based, please refer to Arakelyan (2005) for Armenia, Shafik (1995) for the Czech 
Republic, Bell (1997) for Georgia, Zhandossov (2011) for Kazakhstan, Jermakowicz and 
Pańków (1995) for Kyrgyzstan, Mygind (1999) for Latvia, Terterov and Reuvid (2005) for 
Lithuania, Gutsu (1996) for Moldova, Shen (1997) for Romania, and Pivovarsky (2001) for 
Ukraine.  
 
7 This relationship is best investigated by calculating the “Keynesian multiplier” (i.e. the 
additional growth associated with $1 of government spending). Government spending is 
considered a stimulus when $1 of additional government spending is associated with >$1 of 
economic growth. When evaluating this relationship cross-nationally using our fixed-effects 
model, the coefficient describing this relationship is 1.55, indicating that each $1 of government 
spending is associated with a $1.55 increase in overall growth. Stated alternatively, after 
subtracting government spending from GDP, each $1 of government spending is associated with 
a $0.55 increase in investment, consumption and/or net exports. 
 